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Abstract 
With the development of information technology, people move their lives and 
business into digital world. Widely adopted digital systems make information security 
playing an important role in people's daily activities. From the information security 
point of view, the current authentication methods implemented in information systems 
are not safe enough even with special administrations. 
Backdoor password is a common method to solve the problem of lost or 
forgotten administrative password of an information system. For its function of 
convenience, this method weakens the system security against hostile activities. The 
existence of backdoor account also makes a system vulnerable to attacks. 
Consequently, the information stored in or delivered by the system will face 
unexpected danger. 
In this thesis, a new method based on public key cryptography is proposed to 
replace the traditional backdoor password authentication. Because the system 
designed in this thesis starts from a totally different point, it overcomes the security 
problems that are with traditional backdoor password authentication method. 
Compare to the current backdoor authentication method, our system is more secure, 
dynamically process the request and all keys are only used once. 
Additionally to the principle of our newly method to fulfill the backdoor 
password authentication, this thesis also provide a rough practical multi-user mode 
system together with the system analysis. Also a concept of partial account is 
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As time goes by, people's life changes much with the development of information 
technologies. Almost everyday, people start to turn on their radio or TV to get the 
latest news when they open their eyes in the morning. And even when planning to go 
to bed, people would like to check if they get new email till that moment. When 
people go to work, they manage their normal work according to the information they 
got, make decisions by exchanging the information and minds their colleagues 
provided and handle the urgent issues from newly coming messages; when people go 
out for recreation, they enjoy the movies or music for the relaxing information they 
are experiencing from them, feel entertained for sharing the information when joining 
the activities with other people and are enriched by the books they are reading. Maybe 
they will choose to die if they cannot gain anything through all the means they can. 
Modem people live with, on and for the information. 
Fortunately, technologies help people to get and exchange information fast 
and easily. In the last ten years, the Internet and the applications based on networks go 
beyond our imaginations. More and more people become familiar with this Internet 
and its applications and feel it is a really fast and easy way to exchange information. 
Now, the Internet has grown strong enough to carry the same amount of information 
as many traditional medias like newspaper and TV, or even more. More and more 
business, educations, social services find their wide contacts with their intentions with 
this advanced technology. The Internet and its applications, now called the 
information technologies, help people live more efficiently in the convenience of 
obtaining information. If the computers and their wide adoptions in many fields were 
new industrial revolution, the information technologies would be another peak of this 
revolution waves. 
Now come the questions: who provide all kinds of the information covering as 
many fields as possible and what make the numerous information available to people 
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allover the world? If you are familiar with the information technologies, you maybe 
tell us the answers are ICPs and networks. What is ICP? It is short for Internet 
Content Provider, who provides lots of information to the public, all kinds of，in his 
powerful computer servers. As to network, maybe a pizza boy can explain this term in 
very simple way and is able to be understood even by my grandma. All the technical 
guys know that network has nodes and links. Links are the physical paths connecting 
to all nodes mutually, including the coaxial cables, twisted cables, optical fibers and 
wireless channels. The nodes are the major function parts, mostly are computers and 
special networking equipment. ICPs，servers provide the Internet contents. And the 
special networking equipment is responsible for making the global network a unity 
using the broadcasting, switching, routing technologies. In another words, the server 
nodes provide the information while the special networking nodes direct the 
information to the destinations according to the requests. 
Till now, we know where our information comes from and how it reaches us. 
As it is said that some people would choose to die if they cannot exchange the 
information with others, we begin to worry about the security of these nodes essential 
to us. Maybe those guys are too exaggerating to do so if lacking of information, but in 
nowadays, information equals to wealth. You may think of what it will be if "Yahoo!" 
or "Google™" is out of services for two days. People will feel disturbed a lot - they 
cannot get what they want from the Internet as usual for they are relying on these 
Internet searching portal sites to gather information. Or even worse, if the “Hotmail” 
is down for a whole day, there will be millions of people affected by the failure of this 
biggest worldwide public mail system. Maybe many businesses will be delayed 
because the managers cannot confirm the information from the Internet or check and 
reply the emails as scheduled, and the loss may be in billion dollars. 
But in most cases, our worry about the stability of the services for both server 
and networking nodes is not necessary. Those servers and equipment are all produced 
by worldwide famous manufacturers such as Sun, IBM, HP for the servers, and Cisco, 
Lucent, Nortel for the networking equipment. The qualities of the nodes can be 
reliable enough for the manufacturers' sound reputation. And then these nodes, both 
servers and networking equipment are placed in special rooms with proper 
temperature, humidity, cleanness and even electronic- magnetism. These rooms are 
kept very carefully to avoid physical damages like fire and loss of power. And even 
more, some are guarded by armed soldiers. Finally, all those nodes have 
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administrators whose responsibility is to make everything all right when the nodes go 
wrong. If some nodes are of high importance, private administrators will be assigned 
to ensure the reliabilities and function recoveries. 
All manageable nodes, including the servers and the networking equipment, 
are accessible to their administrators via the password authentication subsystem built-
in their operating platforms. If the services of the nodes fail, the administrators need 
to input password to pass this authentication subsystem and then restart the services or 
repair the services as soon as possible. A “good，，password needs some complexities 
avoiding to being broken, which will make it hard to remember. Of course a good 
administrator must not write down his password for that will be more chances to leak 
it to others. As the result, it is very easy for the administrators to forget the passwords. 
This is a bigger problem compared to the possibilities that the previous problems will 
happen, even an excellent administrator with a best password maybe come up with 
this poor case. If the password of an essential server was really forgotten by such a 
careless administrator, what he will do in the next days is to publish an apology to the 
world and then disconnect this server and try to recover or even reinstall the system 
and the services. It is heavy work to do that and brings humiliation to the reputations 
of the firm providing the services. But compared to the failure of networking 
equipment, it may cost less. If an essential networking equipment failed, many sub-
networks will be affected. Network data may be re-routed to the destinations, which 
will cost a little more routing time than usual and bring traffic press to the new-routed 
virtual links. The worse case may cause the disconnection among the continents. For 
example, in the mid 2001, a man-made failure of the routing service from Beijing to 
Washington, provided by an essential router, dropped all the data between these two 
continental cities to avoid more hostile packets. Many businesses were delayed and 
millions of money was lost in that information war between China and US. So 
without the administrative password, the administrator could help nothing to the fail 
services. No matter it is forgotten or modified by Hackers who have invaded the 
system. 
Till now, we may know the following points: 
• Information exchange plays a important role in our lives now; 
• Information technologies, especially the internet, speed up the 
information exchanges; 
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• Networking nodes and links are the information containers and paths; 
• Networking nodes need administrations, including maintenance as well 
as repairing, based on password authentication; 
• Lost of administrative password will cost much; no matter it is 
forgotten or altered by Hackers. 
From the points listed above, we know that forgetting the administrative 
passwords is unforgivable for the administrators. However it is not a new problem in 
fact. Now let's see how this problem is now settled. 
First let's see the servers operation platforms, take Unix, Windows NT and 
Linux as examples. Unix and Windows NT are classified, by the Trusted Computer 
System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), as with security class of C2, which is far more 
secure than windows95/98/Me, class of D, meaning no security. If the administrative 
passwords of them are forgotten, you have to reboot the system using a "boot disk" 
and/or a "root disk" to reset the administrative password. But for Windows NT, 
anybody can reboot the system; for Unix, only administrative user named “root，，can 
do this. Windows NT is then less secure than Unix as this aspect because the boot 
disk is easy to make in other machines with the same operating system, and the 
system can be reboot safely. As for Linux, oops, it is much easier, no "boot disk，，or 
“root disk" needed. Anybody can reboot the system safely by the combination keys of 
"Ctrl + Alt + Del". When booting, parameter appended can make anyone enter the 
system with the full control without authentication, which is called the single user 
mode of Linux. Anybody can do this if he can reach the keyboard. 
Then what about those essential networking equipment? To monitor the 
performances of those network equipment, administrators always assign them IP 
addresses to access them via network. These equipment also have simple platforms, 
but they are unlike the various functions in the operation systems. Administrative 
users can run some commands to setup certain services of the equipment. Considering 
the importance of the applications, different equipment use different methods to solve 
this forgotten-password problem. Some lower-end equipment, like home use or office 
use switches, routers, working with lO/lOOM Ethernet interfaces, solve this problem 
in a very simple way - reset for all. If you forgot the administrative password, you 
just push the “reset，，button to clear all the settings you have configured before. This 
kind of equipment stored all your configurations as well as the administrative 
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passwords in somewhere like the flash memories. Then all the configurations and the 
passwords will not disappear after they are powered off. But if “reset，，buttons are 
pushed, all stored information will be restored as it is before delivery. Then you can 
manage the equipment using the default password listed in the manuals and re-
configure the services. The method is very simple but you should make your eyes 
open to keep others' fingers away from the "reset" button. However, some high-end 
equipment cannot use this simple method to regain the administration for they are so 
important that they cannot be "reset" and the configurations are very complicated. So 
another method called Backdoor is adopted to ensure the reclamation of the 
administration. The Backdoor in fact is another built-in administrative account, with 
different account name from the normal one. The account is listed in the manual, and 
the password is by default fixed to a certain one. If you forgot your normal 
administrator's password, you just use this backdoor account with fixed password to 
enter the system and get your normal account back. It is somewhat like entering a 
house from the backdoor hiding somewhere in your yard. Definitely, these backdoors 
are very dangerous if they are known to others. But it is not clever to achieve the 
security by hiding secrecy. And now it is very easy to find out those backdoor 
accounts with the aids of the Internet searching, here are some old well-known 
backdoor accounts and the passwords in famous switches and routers: 




N/A monitor monitor 
manager Manager 
3Com security Security 
CellPlex 7000 tech tech 
LANplex2500 debug synnet 
LinkSwitch 2000/2700 
CoreBuilder 7000/6000/3500/2500 
SuperStackllSwitch 2200/2700 tech tech 
Table 1-1 Some well known backdoors in old 3Com products 
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This is just the result of searching the Internet by the keywords “3Com + 
Backdoor，，，if you are interested, you may try other combinations such like "Intel + 
Backdoor，，or "Cisco + Backdoor". Do not be shocked too much if you find the model 
you are using. 
Till now, we may doubt the current solutions to this forgotten-password 
problem in point of view of security. In this thesis, we propose a new design of 
solution to this problem, which is totally different from the present. The design is 
based on cryptographic, with good properties of dynamic generation, one-time use 
and high security. The detail will be discussed in the following chapters. 
1.2 Thesis organization 
Doubting the current solutions, in this thesis, we will propose a new secure one-use 
dynamic backdoor password. It is based on the public key cryptography and totally 
different from the current solutions, which can avoid the traditional weaknesses in the 
password authentication system. And the thesis is organized in this way: 
In Chapter 2, some preparations are done to explain the terminologies and 
relative technologies in password authentication systems. In this chapter, some 
password authentication methods are introduced and compared to extract good 
properties. 
Chapter 3 will focus on detail introducing some cryptography primitives such 
as the symmetric/asymmetric cipher, one-way functions, digital signature, RSA public 
key cryptosystem and so on. Security problems are also described additional to the 
theories of these cryptography technologies. 
The essential part of the thesis follows in Chapter 4. In this chapter, our 
system design will be proposed in detail both in principle with a simple system and in 
practical with a multi-user system, which is much closer to the real case. Additional to 
the principles, some applied technologies are also explained with their potential 
security problems. At the ends of each section, system analyses focus on the 
technologies adopted and the system protocols we proposed. Closer to the real world, 
some different applicable working modes are studied with their possible weaknesses 
at the last of this chapter. 
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Chapter 2. 
Conventional password authentication 
and backdoor password schemes 
Before we start to enter the world of cryptography, we need some preparations on the 
password authentication field, like some basic idea about the password, the password 
authentication and so on. Also backdoor password is another conception we should 
know first. 
2.1 Password and password authentication 
2,1.1 Introduction to password and its security problems 
Password and password authentication are not strange to us for they have been widely 
adopted in many applications. People use password for protection and authentication 
in all computer-based systems, for example, before ATMs or just before computer 
terminals. Password is a part of what used in password authentications, mostly 
together with a certain unique symbol representing the person, like a card number or 
an account user name. And the password authentication is just to tell the user to input 
the pair of the unique symbol and the password. After processing the input 
information and comparing the result to the records, the authenticating system then 
responses by granting the access or turning down the request. 
We all understand what is the password and what the password authentication 
is for. Then what are the major problems for the password? Passwords are for two 
things: protections against others, authentications for granting privileges. The 
recorded passwords are not stored in plain texts, mostly processed by one-way 
functions. This makes the reversing process in much difficulty. Brute Force attack on 
passwords will try each possible combination with different lengths to break the 
password. But unfortunately, most people's passwords are easy to break for they are 
just combination of words, dates, and pronounceable parts. So the Brute Force attack 
based on dictionary will break them even in seconds, which is far more efficient than 
that without dictionary, maybe in millions times less in time. 
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Then what kind of password is good enough for security? There is no good 
enough password against the attack, but "a2#Vxdo!8R" is better than “1234567890” 
in the same length. The reason is very simple - the first one is more random than the 
other, which will foil the attack based on dictionary and the total searching space will 
be quite large by enumerating all possible combinations with Brute Force attack. 
Another important thing is the password length. The longer password length, the more 
difficulty the attack will face because of larger searching space. 
2.1.2 Front-door passwords vs. backdoor passwords 
Passwords are used in authentications based on computer systems, very similar to that 
some one should have the right key to unlock the door to enter his house. All the 
owners unlock the front doors but buglers or some people lost their keys. Similarly, in 
authentication processes, most people use pre-assigned illegal usemame and their own 
passwords to access to their protected issues. But there really do exist some 
unreleased secret accounts in most password-protected systems. They are called 
“backdoors，，in computer systems because they are like some hidden backdoors in 
some houses, which are just known to some people, like the owners. 
What are the backdoors for? If the backdoor in the system is pre-set by the 
manufacturer, you may guess the reasons are acceptable. Most systems set some 
special accounts for testing procedures, say, for debugging in engineering. But those 
special accounts mostly are not removed after the engineers finished the tests. 
Another acceptable reason is for the case of user forgetting his password. In 
this case, the special account's usemame and password are mostly fixed, can be find 
in user manual of the system. This backdoor really helps for those with poor 
memories but also helps those with hostilities. In Chapter 1, we have listed some well 
known backdoor accounts in networking equipment made by famous manufacturers. 
Then what reason is unacceptable? The backdoors are planted intentionally, 
for military or criminal purpose maybe. There are many rumors that US military 
persons are involved in the design of routers made by a famous networking equipment 
manufacturer. And these backdoor passwords will achieve a lot in information 
obstruction at war. 
Can you imagine the case that there exists a backdoor account in banking 
system? Some bad guys may use this backdoor password to do harm to other bank 
users. No one case like this happens in more than hundred years that the banks in 
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serving. It is because that the banking computer system is more secure than normal 
computer network systems, with a security class of B2 defined in TCSEC. But a 
recent case happened in China brought an end to this, some suspects withdrew money 
using a special bankcard without passwords from other accounts. No more evidence 
says that it is relate to backdoor password in the authentication systems in banks, but 
you may have a strong feeling that backdoor password is of much danger. 
Front door password is named as the contrast to the backdoor password, 
referring the normal authenticating password. In summary, here is the table of the 
pros and cons of the front door password and the backdoor password: 
Front door password Backdoor password 
• Belongs to legal users • For special purpose 
• Can be changed by users • More privileges than 
Pros 
• Easily controlled by normal account 
system, like expiration 
• Security strength depends • Fixed with certain user Cons on user choice • Never expire 
Table 2-1 Pros and Cons of the Front/Back door passwords 
2.1.3 Dynamic passwords vs. static passwords 
Passwords are used for security but most people use them insecurely. In previous 
sections we have known some bad habits for choosing and keeping password: Do not 
use your or your lover's name or birthday as your password. Do not use numbers only 
as your password. Do not use one or two words as your password. Do not write down 
your password. Do not speak your password to your boy friend or girl friend. Do 
not... 
You may be suggested in many systems that you'd better change your 
password after some time to ensure the security of the password. That helps lot in 
many systems, in banks, in computers, in networking applications. For maximum 
security in many cases, one-time or one-used passwords are adopted. From the name 
of "One-time" or “One-used，，，you can know that this kind of passwords are used for 
only once, only for this time. Next time when you access the same system, you need a 
new password generated dynamically by some rules. That is why they are called 
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dynamic passwords. As a contrast, the traditional passwords lasting for a period or 
never expired are called static passwords. It is obviously that dynamic passwords are 
more difficult for guessing by brute-force or by dictionary. Together with the 
randomness in choosing password, it will be less possible to trace when trying to 
break. 
There are many methods to utilizing the dynamic passwords in recent years' 
research. But in fact it can be found the similarity in the Code Book of World War II. 
You may generate as many passwords as you need, called a Code Book, all passwords 
are randomly chosen and no relations between every other of them, and each 
password is just like one page of a book. Every time you have to pass the 
authentication, you need use the first page of the Code Book and then just tear this 
page off and discard it, one page each time until all gone. Generating all the 
passwords as needed is not a secure method, the Code Book is very easy stolen or lost. 
This can be improved by generating one password when needed for the next time. 
After finishing all the procedures, user will get a new password when he leaves the 
system. This new password is for the next time he wants to access. 
The idea of generating the dynamic passwords using the public key scheme 
was studied in 1991 by Lein Ham. The proposed scheme needed the same 
computational procedure for both the user and the system. And the logging time was 
also a parameter. Before logging into the system, user has to computer his password 
for this time as input and update the parameters as well as to the system. Details are 
described in [3". 
2.2 Forgotten-password problem 
In Chapter 1，we have introduced this forgotten-password problem and this problem 
happens very often in real world. From that introduction, we all know the results we'll 
get if we forget our passwords. In this section we want to discuss some existing 
methods to solve this problem. 
Most cases are very similar: normal users, in computer systems, banking 
systems or Internet applications, forget their passwords. But when registering to use 
these services, they have registered more other identification papers, like IDs, Social 
Security Numbers or other official papers. Users who have forgotten their passwords 
take these materials to the administrative authorities, and then they will solve this 
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problem by obtaining new passwords in person. Or some Internet applications 
providers just mail user passwords to their registered email boxes. This is a common 
solution to the problem of forgetting normal user passwords. But it is not for the 
problem of forgetting super user (administrator) passwords. And it is insecure too. 
For those system administrators who have forgotten their passwords, lots of 
work has to be done to gain their accesses to the systems back using the methods 
introduced in Chapter 1. One method is to use the emergency preparations made when 
creating the systems to regain the administrative privileges. This is the general 
method in computer systems to solve this problem. And its security is all based on the 
emergency preparations, like emergency disks. But this cannot resist the duplicated 
work done by others, instead of administrators. 
And another method is to set some special procedure so that the password 
authentication can be avoided. This is one kind of backdoors without authentication. 
What to do is just to follow the specified operations, and you may get across the 
authentication process without any password. It is reported that some latest Cisco 
routing product embedded this procedure in its platform. These backdoors are in 
secret, only the designers and engineers knowing about this. But secrecy brings no 
security. It is not a difficult thing to detect this for the router analysts. Soon Cisco 
distributed the patch to the product in their website. 
The third method is the backdoor password. A backdoor user account is placed 
in the user family of the system platforms. If this account is for emergent case of 
forgetting password, it must be another super user to the system. This account must be 
"strongly" recommended in the manual not to release it to others. But in fact you will 
see how “willingly，，the administrators tell this to others, even his girl friend, and his 
colleagues just for convenience. From point of view of security, more super users, 
more dangerous to the system. And mostly the password of the backdoor account is 
fixed, in manual, for easy memorizing. That is the most dangerous aspect for the 
backdoor password. Anyone getting this will have full control of the system. 
Comparing the methods above, we may know that the backdoor account is the 
most convenient one to take back the control of the system but of worst security. That 
is what this thesis contributes most. In this thesis, we propose a new method of 
backdoor password by multi-authentication based on public-key cryptography and 
bring the backdoor account into a partial one. In doing so we bring more security to 
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the authentication process and decrease the possibility of damage to the system that 
the backdoor account will bring. 
Chapter 3. 
Introduction to Cryptography 
Cryptography is a kind of science of keeping message secret. It provides information 
security services in information exchanges. Hundreds or even thousands of years ago, 
cryptosystems were utilized in military organizations for keeping message secret. And 
this science developed much faster in the twice World Wars. For centuries, the 
intelligence and its exchange sometimes decided the results of battles or even a war. 
And the science develops much with the hot wars or cold ones among countries. At 
the end of century, information exchanges change the whole world. Cryptography 
technologies once again play important roles in global communications. Nowadays, 
there is a trend to make all business accessible from the Internet; people have to 
emphasize the securities on the information exchanges. 
In this chapter, we will talk about the cryptography theories and 
methodologies that are involved in the applications mentioned in this thesis. 
3.1 Introduction to information security 
Information security is a set of mechanisms, including protocols and technologies, to 
ensure security services against security attacks. Security attack means any action that 
compromises the security of information owned by an organization. Security 
mechanisms are designed to detect, prevent, or recover from a security attack. And the 
security services are some services that can enhance the security of the data 
processing systems and the information transfers of an organization. The services are 
intended to counter security attacks by making use of one or more security 
mechanisms to provide them. 
Security services 
We can think of the information security services as replicating the types of functions 
normally related with physical documents. As information systems become more 
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widely adopted in the conducts of our affairs, electronic information takes on many of 
the roles traditionally performed by paper documents. Accordingly the types of 
functions associated with paper documents must exist in electronic form. However, 
electronic documents bring more challenges to such functions: 
1. Hard to discriminate between the “original，，and any number of copies of 
electronic documents. There is no difference between them for the electronic 
documents are just a sequence of bits. While in paper documents, it is very 
easy to tell an original paper from a photocopied one. 
2. Altering the electronic documents leaves no physical evidence of the alteration. 
For example, modifying the bits sequence in computer memory leaves no 
physical trace. It is totally different in paper form that any modification has its 
physical change to the surface of the paper. 
3. Some proof processes associated with their physical characteristics become 
invalid, such as the handwriting signatures or embossed seals. Some internal 
evidence must be present in the information itself to make up such proof 
authenticity. 
What are the functions required for common information security associated 
with documents both physical and electronic forms? Table 3-1 lists some of the 
requirements. This table is from [SIMM92b:. 
• Identification • Endorsement 
• Authorization • Access (egress) 
• License and/or certification 參 Validation 
• Signature • Time of occurrence 
• Witnessing (Notarization) 參 Authenticity (software and/or 
參 Concurrence files) 
• Liability • Vote 
• Receipts • Ownership 
• Certification of origination • Registration 
and/or receipt • Approval/disapproval 
• Privacy (secrecy) 
Table 3-1 A partial list of common information security functions 
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The list of table 3-1 is lengthy for covering the common information security 
requirements. But as to the requirements based on modem electronic information 
systems, only some of the functions are focused. 
• Confidentiality 
Ensures that the information in a system or transferred to another are only 
accessible for authorized parties. This type of access may be printing, 
displaying, and other forms of disclosure, including simply revealing the 
existence of an object. 
• Authentication 
Ensures that the origin of a message or electronic document is correctly 
identified, with an assurance that the identity is not false. 
• Integrity 
Ensures that only authorized parties are able to modify a message. The 
modification includes writing, changing, changing status, deleting, creating, 
and delaying or replaying of transmitted information. 
A connection-oriented integrity service deals with a stream message. Then 
stream protection is needed. The service must assure no duplication, insertion, 
modification, reordering, or replays as well as no destruction of data. While a 
connectionless integrity service deals with individual messages, generally 
providing protections against the modification only. There is also another 
hybrid service needed in communications, pointed by Kent in [KENT93a:. 
• Non-repudiation 
Ensures that neither the sender nor the receiver of a message be able to deny 
the transmission. 
參 A c^cess control 
Requires that access to the information resources must be controlled by or for 
the target system. 
• Availability 




There is no single mechanism that will provide all the services listed or perform all 
the functions listed in Table 3-1. Any secure protocol involves more than one 
mechanism to ensure some of services. Cryptography technologies covered in this 
chapter involves many services in the list. 
Security attacks 
Attacks on the information systems can be classified by the affects on the functions of 
the transmissions. In general, there is a flow from the source to a destination. In Fig 3-
1, there depicts some attacks with different behaviors to the normal flow. 
© Hg) 
source destination 
(a) Normal Flow 
o—H © © N ^Q 
source destination source destination 
(b) Interruption (c) Interception 
source ^ ^ ^ destination source destination 
(d) Modification (e) Fabrication 
Fig 3-1 Security attacks on information transmission 
In Fig 3-1 (a) is the normal flow of information transmission. And the rest are 
four major attacks: 
• Interruption 
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Some parts of the communication system is destroyed or become unavailable 
or unusable. This is an attack on availability. For example, some hardware are 
physically destroyed, the communication lines are cut. 
• Interception 
An unauthorized party gains access to the exchanging process. This is an 
attack on confidentiality. The unauthorized party may be a person, a program 
or a computer. There are many cases like wiretapping, capturing, and network 
analysis. 
• Modi 打 cation 
Also an unauthorized party gains access to the communication link and affects 
the data flow. This is a threat to Integrity. Changing values in data files, 
altering a program to make it perform differently and modifying the content of 
a message are some examples. 
• Fabrication 
An unauthorized party inserts some counterfeit objects into the information 
system. This is against Authentication. Packet spoofing is a common case of 
this kind of attack. 
3.2 Conventional cryptography 
Conventional cryptography, also called symmetric encryption or single-key 
encryption was one kind of encryption adopted prior to the application of public-key 
cryptography, namely asymmetric encryption. In this section, we will describe a 
general conventional encryption model as well as a brief survey of classical 
technologies. 
Conventional cryptosystem model 
The conventional encryption process is easy to figure. The original message, named 
as plaintext, is converted into apparently random nonsense, called ciphertext. The 
encryption process consists of an algorithm and a key. The algorithm will produce 
different output using different key with the same message as input. Then the 
ciphertext is transmitted to the receiver end. After getting the ciphertext, the receiver 
will transform it back into the original plaintext using a decryption algorithm and the 
same key that is used for encryption. 
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What are the factors that the security of the conventional encryption depends 
on? First we maybe want to question the capability of the encryption algorithm. It 
must be powerful enough that it is impractical to decrypt a message with the 
ciphertext alone. Another factor should be with the key, we should keep the key away 
from the sight of the opponents, not the secrecy of the algorithm. With the 
conventional encryption, the major security problem is maintaining the secrecy of the 
key. Fig 3-2 shows a cryptosystem with all parties, including the opponents, called the 
cryptanalysts. 
f \ A W X 
Cryptanalyst : V J ^ ^ 
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Message 入 w Encryption ; ^ Decryption 賣 ^ Destination 
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Fig 3-2 Model of Conventional Cryptosystem 
In the cryptosystem shown as Fig 3-2, a source produces a message in 
plaintext, X = \ . Mostly X consists of finite alphabets, 26 English 
letters or binary {0， 1} sequence. Before the encryption process, a key, 
K =[火1，^：2”..^：7]，is generated and then delivered to both the source and destination 
in secure channel. The key can be generated at the source or from the third party 
trusted by both sides. 
With the message X and the key K as input, the encryption algorithm makes 
the ciphertext Y = Y^，….r"] with the formula of 
Y = E,{X) 
which means the ciphertext Y is produce by applying the encryption function as a 
function of the plaintext Xwith another specified parameter K. 
At the receiver end, with the properly key, the ciphertext can be inversely 
transformed into its original form by: 
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An opponent, named cryptanalyst, is able to access Y, but no access to K and X, 
He may try to recovery X and/or K. And the cryptanalyst supposes to have known the 
encryption algorithm £(-) and the decryption algorithm . If the opponent is 
A 
interested in particular message X’ he will do some efforts to get the estimation X of 
message X\ if he is interested in being able to read future message, he may try to 
A recover the estimate of the key, K . 
Cryptographic systems are generally classified with several independent 
dimensions: 
• Substitution cipher and transposition cipher 
These are more like two fundamental techniques other than two kinds of 
encryption methods. This is just for historical reason. In substitution, each 
element in the plaintext is mapped into another to achieve the secrecy. 
Transposition is to rearrange the elements in the plaintext. But most systems 
involve both of these techniques with multi stages of them. 
The goals of these techniques are to achieve confusion and diffusion. 
Confusion means the complicated dependence between the ciphertext and the 
plaintext and the key. While diffusion each bit of the ciphertext is influenced 
by each bit of the plaintext and the key. 
• Symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption 
This classification depends on number of key used. If both sides use the same 
key to encrypt and decrypt a message, the system is referred as a symmetric 
cryptosystem, or single-key, secret-key or conventional system. If either the 
sender or the receiver uses a different key, the system is an asymmetric system, 
or two-key, or public-key cryptosystem. 
• Block cipher and stream cipher 
This is by the way in which the plaintext is processed. One block of elements 
is processed at a time in block cipher, producing an output block for each 
input block. A stream cipher processes the input elements continuously, 
producing output one element at a time as it goes along. 
Attacks on conventional cryptography 
As to the opponent, referred as the cryptanalyst, he tries to discover X and/or K with a 
process named cryptanalysis. The detail processes depend on the encryption schemes 
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and what can obtains. Table 3-2 summarizes the types of cryptanalytic attacks on the 
amount of information known to the cryptanalyst. And the difficulty decreases with 
rows. 
Type of Attacks Known to Cryptanalyst 
Ciphertext only • Encryption algorithms 
• Ciphertext to be decode 
Known plaintext • Encryption algorithms 
• Ciphertext to be coded 
• One or more plaintext-ciphertext pairs 
formed with the same secret key 
Chosen plaintext • Encryption algorithms 
• Ciphertext to be coded 
• Plaintext message chosen by cryptanalyst, 
together with its cipher part generate with 
the secret key 
Chosen ciphertext • Encryption algorithms 
• Ciphertext to be coded 
• Purported ciphertext chosen by 
cryptanalyst, together with its decrypted 
part generated with the secret key 
Chosen text • Encryption algorithms 
• Ciphertext to be coded 
• Plaintext message chosen by cryptanalyst, 
together with its cipher part generate with 
the secret key 
• Purported ciphertext chosen by 
cryptanalyst, together with its decrypted 
part generated with the secret key 
Table 3-2 Type of attacks on encrypted messages 
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Besides the common attacks against cryptography, there are also other attacks 
aiming at different algorithms. And sometimes the specified attacks really work and 
make the algorithms fail or have to be revised. A good example is the differential 
cryptanalysis attack on DBS, which is in [BIHA93: • 
Conventional cryptography techniques 
The basic blocks for cryptosystems are substitution and transposition. These blocks 
played important role in encryption hundreds years ago. Today, they are not use 
separately, becoming parts of stages combined in modem techniques for cryptography. 
In symmetric encryption, there are two major algorithms now commonly used - DES 
and IDEA. 
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) was adopted in 1977 by the US National 
Bureau of Standards, now the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
as Federal Information Processing Standard 64 (FIPS PUB 64). In the algorithm in 
DES, data are encrypted in 64-bit blocks, using a 56-bit key. The algorithm 
transforms the input into an output with the same 64-bit length in series. In decryption, 
the same key is used to do the reverse. Detail in this may refers to [4] and [5]. With 
criticisms and small modifications, this DES algorithm has flourished and is widely 
used, especially in financial applications. And then based on DES, there develops 
Triple DES, which are included in PGP and S/MME in Internet applications. You 
may find the details in [TUCH79] with two keys and [KALI96] with three keys. 
The International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) is another symmetric 
block cipher developed by Xuejia Lai and James Massey of Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology. It was published in [LAI90] and revised in [LAI91] and [LAI92]. IDEA 
is considered to replace DES for its successful adoption in PGP and widely used 
nowadays. Additional to different algorithm designed for better achievements in 
confusion and diffusion, IDEA uses a 128-bit key to encrypt data in blocks of 64-bit. 
The longer key length makes IDEA more secure far into the future. 
Besides the DES and IDEA, there do exist other symmetric encryption 
algorithms proposed to meet different requirements. They are Blowfish algorithm by 
Bruce Schneier in [SCHN93, SCHN94]; and RC5 in [RIVE94, RIVE95], RC2 in 
[RIVE97] by Ron Rivest; and CAST-128 by Carlisle Adams and Stafford Tavares in 
[ADAM97a]. These algorithms have its own characteristics on the trade-off between 
speed and security, able to apply in various cases. 
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3.3 Public-key cryptography 
Compared with the symmetric cryptography, the development of public-key 
cryptography is the greatest and perhaps the only true revolution in the whole field of 
cryptography. Public-key cryptography is based on difficult mathematics problems 
rather than the combination of substitution and transposition or permutation 
techniques, which are the basic blocks in conventional cryptography. 
Principle of public-key ciyptography 
The public-key algorithms use one key for encryption and a different by related key 
for decryption. The key for encryption is from the other end of the communication, 
which is public to anyone. The companion key for decryption is kept secret in the side 
that does the decryption. They are called the public key and the private key 
respectively. For example, if Alice want to send a message to Bob in secret, she just 
needs to encrypt the message using Bob's public key so that nobody else but Bob can 
get the original message decrypting with his private key. 
A public-key cryptosystem works as the illustration of Fig 3-3: 
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• source algorithm 丨 i algorithm 
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Key Pair 
source v J 
Fig 3-3 Public-key cryptosystem 
Similar to Fig 3-2，some source A produces message in plaintext 
X = . The M elements of X are also in finite alphabet. And the 
message is planned to be delivered to the destination B. B generates a related pair of 
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keys: a public key KU^ and a private key, KRb • KR^ is only known to B while KUf, 
is available to anyone including A. 
With the message X and the encryption key KUB as input, A produces the 
ciphtext l^  = [r”1^2，"“y"] by 
Y = E • � 
The intended receiver can process the reverse transform using the related private key 
to get the original message: 
A cryptanalyst observes the ciphertext Y and has access to the B's public key 
KUb but the private key KRb. We also assume that the opponent has knowledge of 
the encryption and decryption algorithms. And together with what he has, he tries to 
recover X or even the private key to know the further message to B. The estimations 
A A 
to X and KR^ in the figure are noted as X and KRB • 
Applications of public-key cryptography 
For two keys as a relate pair, each end of the communication can choose which one is 
applied to the message depending the applications. Public-key systems are 
characterized by use of the types of algorithms with the two keys. The sender can use 
either the sender's private key or the receiver's public key, or both to carry out 
different cryptographic functions. 
• Encryption/decryption 
A straightforward application of public-key system, the sender encrypts the 
message using the receiver's public key. And the ciphertext is processed by 
the receiver using his own private key. 
• Digital signature 
Making adjustment to the order of the usage of the key pair, the sender “signs” 
a message with his private key. The singing process is performed by a 
cryptographic algorithm applied to the message, producing a block of data that 
is a function of the message related to the private key. This can provide a 
method of authentication. 
• Key exchange 
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Two sides cooperate to exchange a session key as part of in hybrid 
cryptosystems. There exist many approaches to this function, involving the 
private keys of one or both parties. 
Requirements for public-key cryptography 
There are many public-key cryptographic algorithms for different applications. For 
example, in 1978，Ron Rivest, Adi shamir and Len Adleman at MIT developed the 
famous RSA, published as [RJVE78], then afterward the Elliptic Curve Cryptography. 
But the conception of public-key cryptograph was first proposed without 
demonstrating the existence of such algorithms by Diffie and Hellman in [DIFF76b；. 
They pointed that the requirements or the characteristics of the public-key 
cryptosystem must be: 
1. It is computationally easy for a part B to generate a key pair (public key KU^， 
private key KR^). 
2. It is computationally easy for a sender A, knowing the public key and the 
message M, to generate the corresponding ciphertext: 
C = E^(M) 
3. It is computationally easy for the receiver B to decrypt the ciphertext using the 
private key to recover the original message: 
4. It is computationally infeasible for an opponent, knowing the public key to 
determine the private key. 
5. It is computationally infeasible for an opponent, knowing the public key and ta 
ciphertext, to recover the original message. 
Generally, the term easy is defined to mean a problem that can be solved in 
polynomial time as a function of input length. If the effort to solve grows faster than 
polynomial time as a function of input length we just call that problem is infeasible. 
But it is difficult to determine which problem can show this complexity and the 
accurate definition is beyond the coverage of this thesis. 
Public-key Cryptanalysis 
Similar to the conventional encryption, any public-key encryption scheme is 
vulnerable to a brute-force attack. The counteraieasure is the same: use large keys. 
But for public-key systems, the computation complexity is based on some special 
difficult mathematic problems, whose calculation grows faster than polynomial time. 
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There should be a trade-off between the key size and the calculating speed. In practice, 
the key sizes are proposed to make enough strength against the brute-force attack but 
result not too slow for encryption/decryption speeds for general use. 
Another straightforward attacking idea is to find some way to compute the 
private key given the public key. Till now, no one claims that he has one method of 
this kind of attacks that works on some particular public-key algorithm. But on the 
other hand, no one, either, can mathematically prove that this form of attack is 
infeasible. 
Besides the attacks on the mathematical way, there do exist some attacks 
against the protocol, which is of less computational work and effective. The-man-in-
the-middle attack is the representative working in modification mode in Fig 3-1 (d). 
The interceptor, noted as C, gets himself involved from the beginning of the 
communication between A and B. C acts as a double-faced guy: he pretends to be B 
and send his own public key to A as B，s，and then do the same to A. C of course get 
both A and B，s public keys. When A sends a message to B, encrypting it with “B’s” 
public key. Then C intercepts the message and decrypts it easily using his private key. 
After C gets the original message, eh also re-encrypts it using real B，s public key and 
sends it to B. The same is done to the message from B. In this way, the interceptor C 
gets the messages between A and B without any affect to the communication hand 
unable to be detected. 
But this attack is easy to be avoided since Ron Rivest and Adi Shamir 
invented a protocol to foil this in 1984，the inter-lock protocol. The principle of the 
protocol is very simple: just send one encrypted block half each time with 
confirmation. And the reason is that half of encrypted message is useless, unable to 
recover its corresponding plaintext of course. With confirmation in each step, C 
cannot add much delay on trying to recover the whole block and then re-encrypt it and 
send B the half. 
3.4 RSA cryptosystem 
The public-key cryptography was introduced in Diffie and Hellman's paper in 
[DIFF76b], which created a new stage in this field. As to practical cryptosystem, RSA 
by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman was one of the first responses to the 
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challenge proposed. Since RSA scheme invented, it has become the only widely 
accepted and implemented approach to public-key encryption. 
Description of algorithm 
RSA scheme is also a scheme cipher in which the plaintext and the ciphertext as input 
are integers between 0 and n-1 for some n. And its algorithm relies on the modular 
arithmetic. And its security is based on the difficulty of factoring large numbers. 
To make encryption and decryption, each end needs the public key and the private 
key, which are 100 to 200 digits or longer primes: 
p’q Two large primes, for maximum security they should be of equal 
length. 
N The public key, the product o f p and q, 
E The public key, a randomly chosen number which is less than n and 
relatively prime to 於 ( w ) = ( p - l)iq -1) • 
D The private key, the inverse of {e mod (p-l)(q-l)) such that {ed=\ 
mod (p-l)(q-l)). 
— 
Table 3-3 Key generations for RSA 
Note that the secrecy of p and q are very important. Because they are not 
useful any longer, it is better to destroy them after used. All security is based on 
factoring the niop and q, so if they are obtained to cryptanalysts, the private key will 
be recovered. And no ciphertext there will be. 
After the key generation, the encryption and decryption are very simple. To 
encrypt a message m，just divided it into blocks, m.，which are smaller than log? n -
bit length. The encrypted message, c, will consists of similarly sized message blocks, 
c.. And the encryption formula is simple: 
Cf = m, modn 
The decryption part is also simple: 
m. = modn 
since 
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the formula recovers the message. 
Both the sender and receiver must know the value of n. The public key is 
KU = {e,n} and the private key is KR = {d,n}. Or just simplified as the public key is 
e and the private key is d. 
Attacks on RSA 
In summary, there are three possible approaches to attacking the RSA algorithm. They 
are Brute force, mathematical and Timing attacks. The following gives a simple 
description of them. 
• Brute force attack 
This attack involves trying all possible private keys. Undoubtedly, it is the 
most time consuming work for the key lengths of RSA are mostly in 100 or 
200 or even much longer in digits. The computation is the killing factor 
comparing to other types of attacks. 
• Mathematical attacks 
There are several approaches but all equivalent in effect to factoring the 
product of two primes, which is the base of security of RSA. Most discussions 
of cryptanalysis of RSA focus on factoring n into its prime factors p and q. 
And some focus on determine the ，which was proved to be equal to the 
previous one in [RIBE96]. Known of algorithms, given e and n, determining d 
appears to be at least as time-consuming as the factoring problem, mentioned 
in [KALI95]. That is also why the factoring performance can be a benchmark 
evaluating the security of RSA. 
For a large n with large prime factors, factoring is a hard problem, but not as 
hard as it used to be. There are two threats to the large keys: the continuing 
increase in computing power of super computers and the continuing 
refinement of factoring algorithms. In the last 5 years, people may be 
astonished by the increase of the computing power of the computers. And the 
technologies push the power by inventing computing techniques such as 
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cooperating a cluster of computers to do the same problem as a group. In 
;ODLY95], a related algorithm, named the Special Number Field Sieve 
(SNFS), is mentioned to factor some numbers much faster than by the 
conventional way. So for the near future, we may choose 2048-bit RSA other 
than 1024-bit now as reasonable encryption key. 
• Timing attacks 
Paul Kocher, in [KOCH96], demonstrated that a snooper can determine a 
private key by keeping track of how long a computer takes to decipher 
messages. This is applicable not just to RSA, but to other public-key 
cryptosystems. 
A timing attack is from a completely unexpected direction and it is a cipher 
only attack. The details can be found in [KOCH96], and we can understand it 
in a simple way: it is like that we determine the dialing number by the time of 
ticktack of the dial-pad of a phone. That is from the calculation of different 
bits takes different time. Although timing attack is a serious threat to public-
key cryptosystems, it is easy to foiled by some tricks like adding random 
delay in calculation. In real world, the RSA Data Security Inc. uses some 
techniques to avoid this attack with performance penalty of 2% to 10%. 
3.5 One-way function 
Common One-way functions 
One-way function is the central to public-key cryptography. In most protocols one-
way functions are fundamental building blocks. Just from the name, we can 
understand it in this way: One-way functions are easy to compute but significantly 
hard to reverse. That is, given x, it is easy to compute f(x), but given/fe), it is hard to 
compute X. The term "hard" may best refer that it might take millions of years to 
compute X from f(x), even using all the computer in the world. 
What are the one-way functions are for? We cannot use it to encrypt messages 
of course for its infeasibility of computing the inverse. But the result of the one-way 
function can be used as a method of authentication. Most nowadays password systems 
work with this one-way function for authentications and password storages. 
A trapdoor one-way function is a special type of one-way fiinction, with a secret 
trapdoor. It is also easy to computer one way and hard in reverse way. But if you 
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know the secret, you can easily perform the reverse function. That is, it is easy to 
computer/(X； given x, but hard to compute x from f(x). However, if you get the secret 
少，then you may compute x from f(x) easily. Encryption/decryption can be regarded as 
an example of the trapdoor one-way function. 
Hash functions 
With some specifications, the one-way function has the name of Hash function in 
computer world. And the result of Hash function is referred as Hash value. A Hash 
value h is generated by a Hash function//by form of: 
h : H{M) 
where M is a variable-length message and is a fixed-length hash value. In most 
cases, the hash value is appended to the message at the source at a time when the 
message is assumed to be correct. The receiver authenticates the message by 
computing the hash value. This is what we called Message Authentication. 
Requirements of Hash function 
The purpose of a hash function is to produce a "fingerprint" of a file, a message, or a 
block of data. To be useful in Message Authentication, a hash function H must meet 
the requirements in [NECH92] or as followings: 
1. H e m be applied to a block of data of any size. 
2. H produces a fixed-length of output. 
3. H(x) is relatively easy to compute for any given x. 
4. For any given hash value h, it is computationally infeasible to find x such that 
H{x) = h . This is referred to as its one-way property. 
5. For any given block x, it is computationally infeasible to find y ^ x with 
H{y) = . This is referred to as weak collision resistance. 
6. It is computationally infeasible to find any pair of (x, y) such that 
H{x) = II(y) • This is referred to as strong collision resistance. 
The first three requirements are for practical applications for message 
authentication. The fourth is the one-way property: it is easy to generate the hash 
value or the hash code of a message but virtually impossible to generate a message 
from a code. The fifth means unable to find an alternative message hashing to the 
same value, which prevents forgery. The sixth refers how to resist a class of attack 
known as the birthday attack on the hash functions. 
Some Hash functions 
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There are many one-way hash functions designed for different applications. Here we 
give a brief introduction to them, detail descriptions on their algorithms can be found 
in corresponding references. 
A/^ -Hash is an algorithm invented by researchers at Nippon Telephone and 
Telegraph in 1990. AT-Hash uses a 128-bit message blocks, a complicated randomizing 
function, and produces a 128-bit hash value. But after the proposal of A -^Hash, many 
attacks were successfully applied to 6-round and some broke any N that was divided 
by 3，more efficient than birthday attack. 
MDx family consists of two branches of one-way functions: MD4/MD5 and 
MD2. MD is short for Message Digest. The designer is Ron Rivest. MD4 was 
designed in 1990 as RFC 1186, which produces 128-bit hash value. To face the 
challenge of cryptanalysis on the algorithms, Ron Rivest strengthened it to MD5, 
which is now adopted in many practical systems. MD2 is also proposed by Ron 
Rivest in 1992, along with MD5. MD2 used a different algorithm to ensure the 
security but the cost is that it is the most slower than any others. 
Another algorithm, named as Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), was designed by 
NIST and NSA in 1994. It was really a part of the Digital Signature Standard 
proposed by those two departments. SHA can be thought as a improvement of MD4, 
but it produces 160-bit hash value. Longer hash value is more resistant to brute-force 
attacks, including the birthday attack. And there are no known attacks against SHA. 
Security of Hash functions 
Just as with conventional and public-key encryption, we may classify the attacks on 
hash functions into two categories: brute-force attacks and cryptanalysis. 
Brute-force attack searches all possible key space to produce the right one to 
break the hash function. The strength of hash functions against this attack is solely 
based on the length of the hash code produced by the algorithms. Recall the last three 
requirements of one-way functions, they are called one way, weak collision resistance 
and strong collision resistance. And the computational orders for a code of length n 
are proportional to the following: 
One way 2" 
Weak collision resistance 2" 
Strong collision resistance 2”" 
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From the table, we know that the birthday attack is more efficient in brute-
force attacks, which makes the strong collision resistance the major requirement 
concerning the security. To ensure the security of hush function against brute-force 
attack (including the birthday attack), we'd better use ones with longer outputs. 
Cryptanalysis attack on hash functions needs to exploit some properties of the 
algorithms to perform attacks other than exhaustive search. In hash algorithms, there 
involve repeated use of a compression function. And the cryptanalysts always focus 
on the internal structure of this compression function and attempt to find efficient 
techniques for producing collisions for a single execution of this function. All 
possible weakness of hush functions are based on a fact - there must exist collisions, 
because we map a message block to shorter length. What is required is to make it 
computationally infeasible to find the collisions. 
3.6 Digital signature 
Requirement of Digital Signature 
We all know about the handwriting signatures, they have been used as proof of the 
authorship of or at least agreement with the contents of a document. For a handwriting 
signature, it provides the following functions: 
1. The signature is authentic. It is convinces the document's recipient that the 
singer deliberately signed it. 
2. The signature is unforgeable. It is proof that the signer, not one else, 
deliberately signed the document. 
3. The signature is not reusable. The signature is part of the document; anybody 
cannot move it to a different document. 
4. The signature is unalterable. After signed, the signature alteration is easily 
detectable. 
5. The signature cannot be repudiated. The signature and the document are 
physical things so that the signer cannot deny that he signed it. 
This kind of authentication was imported into computer world, named as 
Digital Signature. It is obvious that in computer systems, the functions of physical 
signature all fail without any improvement on the properties of itself. 
Categories of Digital Signature 
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Reviewing the requirement of the digital signature, we know that it is for 
authentication between the sender and the receiver. There are two categories of the 
approaches: direct and arbitrated. 
Direct digital signature involves the communicating parties only. It is assumed 
that the receiver knows the sender's public key. It is a simple way to perform the 
signature functions. But there is a weakness of denying the signatures by claiming that 
the private key was lost or stolen. Some administrative controls, time-stamping for 
instance, are then applied to the security of direct signature to weaken this threat. 
An enhancement on the direct digital signature is to introduce a third party of 
arbitrator. In general terms, the three parties works this way: All signed message from 
sender X to receiver Y goes to an arbitrator A, who does lot of process to verifying 
the message's origin and content. Then the message is delivered to Y with an 
indication that it has been verified to the satisfaction of the arbitrator. The arbitrator 
plays so important role in the arbitrated digital signature scheme that all parties must 
have great deal of trust on him that the mechanism works properly. Some different 
scenarios were proposed in [AKL83] and [MITC92] according to whether the 
arbitrator can see the messages in the signature verification process. 
Digital signature with symmetric cryptography 
If X wants to sign a digital message and send it to Y with symmetric cryptography, 
arbitrated signature should be used. The Arbiter, A, shares secret keys both with X 
and Y, noted as Kx and Ky. 
1. X encrypts the message to A with K^ and sends it to A. 
2. A decrypts the message with K^ . 
3. Together with a statement that the message is from X, A encrypts the message 
using Ky. 
4. A sends the bundled message to Y. 
5. Y decrypts it with Ky. He can read both the message and A，s certification that 
X sent it. 
For highly trusted A, the protocol works in principle. But A will spend his day 
decrypting and encrypting messages between any pair of people who want to send 
signed documents to one another. Also the maintenance of A will cost a lot for his 
important role in the communications. Basically, it is not a protocol for practice. 
Digital signature with public-key cryptography 
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There are many public-key algorithms that can be used for digital signatures. Here we 
just introduce some of them, which are widely adopted in many applications. 
The basic protocol is very simple: 
1. X encrypts the document with his private key, thereby signing the document. 
2. X sends the signed document to Y. 
3. Y decrypts the document with X，s public key to verifying the signature. 
In this way, there is no need of existence of the arbitrator, and not so much 
meaningless heavy intermediate work done by the arbitrator. Also this simple protocol 
can satisfy the required functions a signature scheme should provide. 
The Digital Signature Algorithm was proposed in 1991 by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) in Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 
PUB 186. This algorithm then was part of the Digital Signature Standard and 
designed only for digital signature. 
Another scheme applied in digital signature is the RSA. Not like other 
algorithms, RSA can be used in encryption, digital signature and key exchange. The 
RSA digital signature scheme is similar to the RSA encryption/decryption algorithm. 
Let d be the private key and e be the public key. The signature 5 on a message M 
using the private key d is 
s = Md modn 
To verify the signature, just need to check for the following equality using the 
public key e: 
v = s^ modn 
There do exist other signature schemes such like Elliptic Curve Signature, 
GOST Digital Signature Algorithm and etc. But they are not so widely used or not 
applied to our system design, here will not cover these algorithms. If necessary, just 
refer to those articles for further information. 
Digital signature with time stamping 
In certain circumstance, some cheats can happen in digital signature schemes. Reuse 
the signed documents or the signatures will cost lost or at least confuse in 
verifications. 
Consequently, digital signatures often include timestamps. The date and time 
of the signature are attached to the message and signed along with the rest of the 
message. There will be no validation of two verifications with the same timestamp. 
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Digital signature with encryption 
Digital signature is just for the authentication between the communicating parties. The 
functions provided by signature will be of nothing if without protection by encryption. 
Almost all signatures are designed to cooperate with different kinds of encryption 
algorithms. 
1. X signs the message with his private key. 
2. X encrypts the signed message with Y，s public key and sends it to Y. 
3. Y decrypts the message with his private key. 
4. Y verifies the signature with X，s public key and recovers the message. 
Signing before encryption seems natural for providing more security - an 
adversary cannot remove a signature from a encrypted message and add his won. Also, 
this avoids the signer signing something he does not know but pretending in 
encrypted way. Of course, sender should use different public and private key pairs to 
do the signature and encryption/decryption. 
Blind Signatures 
An essential feature of digital signature protocols is that the signer knows what he is 
signing. But sometimes, we really want people to sign documents without ever seeing 
their contents. It is called the blind signatures. 
If Bob is a notary public, Alice wants him to sign a document, but does not 
want him to have any idea what he is signing. Bob doesn't care it and is willing to go 
with it. Then a completely blind signature protocol is as following: 
1. Alice takes the document and multiplies it by a random value, named a 
blinding factor. 
2. Alice sends the blinded document to Bob. 
3. Bob signs the blinded document. 
4. Alice divides out the blinding factor, leaving the original document signed by 
Bob. 
By this protocol, the signature can be proof that Bob signed the document 
without knowing the content. The blind signature protocol also satisfies the 
requirement of digital signatures. Any attacker in fact knows less than Bob, hard to 
break or forge the signature. 
But any application in practical, complete blind signature is not useful. So cut-
and-choose technique is chosen to utilize against Alice's possible cheats. The blind 
signature works similarly: Bob will be given a lot of documents, and he will open all 
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for examination but one and sign the last. This technique just takes some samples by 
require the blinding factors from Alice. This is secure against the possibility of 
Alice's intentional cheats. 
3.7 Secret sharing 
The idea of secret sharing is from some real cases in life, maybe from vote and 
decision problem. To share a secret among a group of trust parties, just divide it into 
pieces, called shares or shadows, and distribute the shares among the users. Each user 
with a share, just a part of the secret, of course cannot recover the whole secret. But 
the pooled shares of specific subsets, or altogether, of users allow reconstruction of 
the original secret. 
All shares reconstruct the original secret is not difficult at all. But when we 
talk about the secret sharing problem in cryptography, we mostly mean a threshold 
scheme. The simplest level of this scheme is to divide the message into n pieces, such 
that any t of them can be used to reconstruct the message. This scheme is called the {t, 
«)-threshold scheme. This idea was invented independently by Adi Shamir and 
George Blakley. Many algorithms were proposed following the idea, more can be 
found in [MOV96]. 
There are many ways to cheat in threshold scheme of secret sharing: 
Somebody holding a share may input fake part in reconstruction when he is against it; 
unrelated party may cheat some shares by making fake reconstructing indication; and 
even worse, unrelated party may successfully push the reconstruction by meeting the 
threshold. To prevent cheatings in secret sharing, Shamir improved the simple fairly 
divided shares into unfair ones. A VIP may be in the groups, who will hold more 
shares than others; Or some in the groups are given more shares than others. They are 
chosen carefully enough to reduce the possibility of cheatings mentioned above. 
Additionally, many mathematical algorithms were proposed to be applied in secret 
sharing scheme to ensure the security of secret sharing. 
3.8 Zero-knowledge proof 
Most proofs are the evidences or the witnesses themselves. And the proving processes 
need to show them to who request the proofs. Zero-knowledge proof is another kind 
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of trustful proving method of owning something without disclosing the secret to 
others, related or unrelated. 
In real world, we often use some physical tokens as proofs of identity: IDs, 
passports, credit cards and so on. And in digital world, using zero-knowledge proof, 
people may prove their identities without disclosing private properties. Ureiel Feige, 
Amos Fiat, and Adi Shamir proposed the first protocol for zero-knowledge proof of 
identity. Alice's private key becomes a function of her identity. Using the zero-
knowledge proof, she proves that she knows her private key and therefore proves her 
identity. Algorithm for this protocol was referred to as random challenge. 
Let us give a simple zero-knowledge proof of a Discrete Logarithm for 
explanation. This protocol was designed by David Chaum, Evertse, and Graff in 
CevdG88]: Alice wants to show Bob that she knows some secret x that satisfies 
A"" = 5 mod p 
where is a prime, and x is a random number relatively prime to p-l. The number A, 
B andp are public, but x is secret. Here it comes: 
1. Bob generates a random number b and sends it to Alice. This b is called the 
random challenge. 
2. Alice sends back a response s = r + bxmo&p-\ and h = A", where r is a 
random number with r<p. 
3. Bob verifies the response by finding whether A' modp = hB^ modp holds. 
If it does not, then it is obvious that Alice don't know x. 
The proof of this is straightforward. In this protocol, with challenge and 
response, Alice sends s and h instead of secret x but successfully proves that she 
knows X. In fact, A"" modp can also be used as Alice's digital signature using the 
secret x. For the difficulty of computing the discrete logarithm, it is computationally 
infeasible to recover the secret x from the A"" modp . 
Is this zero-knowledge proof perfect against attacks? The answer is definitely 
not; there are many abuses to this identification protocol. Some secret agents may 
collude to ask for somebody's proof of his identity and then pretend to be the victim. 
Also someone may have more than one identity, which make him untraceable if he 
stops using one. Secret can be bought; the proof of identity may involve more than 
cryptographic issues. To make this identity proof protocol work, lots need to be done 
to ensure the security. 
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3.9 Key management 
All encryption/decryption and digital signatures rely on keys, the same key for 
symmetric cryptosystems and private/public key pair in public-key cryptosystems. For 
all cryptosystems to work, the two parties must exchange the keys between them or 
distribute to public. And the access control to the distributed keys needs to consider 
thoroughly. That is why introduces key management in cryptosystems. In this section, 
both conventional and public-key cryptography key distributions are covered. 
3,9.1 Key distribution in conventional cryptography 
In conventional cryptosystem, the communicating parties need to exchange the same 
key as the secret key to start the encryption and decryption. Additionally they should 
not allow others to see the key. For two parties A and B, key distribution can be 
achieved as followings: 
1. The secret key can be selected by A and then physically and securely 
delivered to B. 
2. The secret key can be selected by a third party then physically and securely 
delivered to both A and B. 
3. If A and B have previously and recently used a key, one can transmit the new 
key to the other, encrypting the new key with the old one. 
4. If both A and B have encrypted connection to a third party C, C can deliver 
the secret key on the secure links to A and B. 
For real cases in symmetric cryptosystems, some variation on option 4 has 
been widely adopted. In this scheme, a Key Distribution Center (KDC) is responsible 
for distributing keys to pairs of users as needed. Each user of course must share a 
unique key with the KDC for purpose of key distribution. 
The use of KDC is based on a hierarchy of keys. For more security, two levels 
of keys are used. Communication between end systems is encrypted using a 
temporary key, named as a session key. And typically, a session key is used just for 
the duration of a logical connection, such as a virtual circuit or transparent connection, 
and then discarded. And each session key is obtained from KDC over the same 
network facilities. Accordingly, session keys are transmitted in encrypted way, using 
a master key that is shared by the KDC and an end system. 
Key distribution based on KDC 
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A typical scenario of key distribution is introduced in [POPE79]. The scenario 
assumes that each user shares a unique master key with the KDC. Fig 3-3 shows how 
it works. 
( KDC ) 
(1) Request II iV, / / / 
/ (2) E^XK, II Request || A^, || 
( I n i t i a t o r A ) ( Responder B ) 
(5) 
Fig 3-3 A scenario for Key Distribution in conventional cryptosystems 
We assume that a user A wants to establish a logical connection to B and 
requires a one-time session key to protect the data transmission over the connection. 
A shares a secret key K^ with KDC. as the master key; Similarly, B shares another, 
Kb, with the KDC. The key distribution process in [POPE79] works as this way: 
1. A issues a request to the KDC for a session key to protect a logical connection 
to B. The message includes the identity of A and B and a unique identifier, 
N^，for this transaction, which is named as a nonce. The nonce differs in each 
request and must be difficult to guess to prevent masquerade. A random 
number is a good choice for a nonce. 
2. The KDC responds with a message encrypted using K^. The message is only 
readable to A and A knows it is from the KDC also. The responding message 
includes three parts: 
今 The one-time session key, K^，to be used in the session to B. 
� The original request from A, including the nonce. This is for A to verify 
that its original request was not altered before it reached KDC. And the 
insurance is mostly from the nonce for its randomness. 
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今 Some items intends for B: the one-time session key K^ and an identifier 
of A, ID A，network address for instance. These two items are encrypted 
using the master key that the KDC shared with B, K^ • They are to be 
sent to B by A to establish the connection and verify A's identity. 
3. A stores the session for the upcoming session. Then he forwards the 
information that generated by the KDC and intended to B, ATJ^, 乃i . 
Because the information is encrypted using B，s secret key, it is protected from 
eavesdropping. Then B knows the session key and A's identity and are sure of 
its origination from the KDC. 
At this point, a session key has been securely delivered to both A and B, and 
they may begin their protected exchanges. But if more authentications are desired to 
confirm the information in step 3 is not faked, the followings are needed: 
4. Using the newly session key for encryption, B sends a nonce, N2，to A. 
5. A responds with f {N^)，where f is a function known to B. 
Decentralized Key distribution 
The use of KDC relies on the highly trust on the KDC for all communicating parties. 
And maintenance of KDC and the security problems of KDC will affect the key 
distribution very much. Another idea of decentralized key distribution was proposed 
too. 
(1) Request II N^  
(Initiator A ) (Responder B ) 
(2) IRequestI\ID,\ \f{N,)\ 
( 3 ) � “ / � ] 
Fig 3-4 Decentralized key distribution 
And a session key may be generated with the following steps: 
1. A issues a request to B for a session key and includes a nonce N � . 
2. B responds with a message that is encrypted using the shared master key. The 
encrypted message includes the session key selected by B, an identifier of B, 
the value of f {N^) and another nonce N^ • 
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3. Using the new session key, A returns f {N^) to B for confirmation. 
3.9.2 Distribution of public keys 
Before the public-key encryption starts, all users need to get the public keys of 
according communicating parties. Of course the users who want to share secure 
information by public-key encryption also need to publish their public keys to public. 
But here it has a major weakness: anyone can forge a public announcement of a 
public key. If some could pretend to be a certain user A, and then send a public key to 
another participant or broadcast such a public key, before A detects this, the forger 
has got all encrypted messages intends to A. 
Publicly Available Directory 
Since uncontrolled public key publication is unacceptable, an idea of maintaining a 
publicly available dynamic directory of public keys can achieve greater degree of 
security. Maintenance and distribution of the public directory should be responsibility 
of some trusted entity or organization. Such a publicly available directory should 
include the following elements to ensure both the functionality and the security: 
1. The authority maintains a directory with a {name, public key} entry for each 
participant. 
2. Each participant registers a public key with the directory authority. The 
registration should be in person or by some secure authenticated 
communication. 
3. Any participant may update his public key in secure way and authentication 
between participants and the authority is needed. 
4. Periodically, the authority publishes the directory to public for requesting. 
The existence of the trusted authority brings more security than individual 
public announcement. It also has problems such as passing out faked public key and 
then eavesdropping on subsequent messages. Also the opponent may tamper the 
records kept by the authority. 
Public-key authority 
If the authority holds a tight control on distributing the public key from the directory, 
higher security will also achieved. And typical idea is that the authority shares 
(public-key, private-key) pairs with all participants, which are used for secure 
communication in public-key distribution. 
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Secured by public-key encryption on communications between the participants 
and the authority, each participant can get the other's public key from secure channel. 
More after that, verification still need to do between the participants. This verification 
can be done with the means of encrypting some combinations of nonce and returning 
back also in encrypted way. This is similar to the parts in key distribution in 
conventional cryptosystems. 
Public-key certificates 
Strengthening on security in the key distribution from the authority's directory, heavy 
loads are also brought to the authority 一 for each start of communication, the authority 
must get involved to distribute the public keys securely. The Public-key Certificate is 
another alternative approach without contacts between the participants and the 
authority. 
The requirements of the certificates are proposed in [KOHN78] and [DENN83； 
as well as followings: 
1. Any participant can read a certificate to determine the name and the public key 
of the certificate's owner. 
2. Any participant can verify that the certificate is originally generated by the 
certificates authority and not faked. 
3. Only the certificates authority can create or update certificates. 
4. Any participant can verify the currency of the certificate. 
A certificate scheme is very simple: 
1. Each participant applies to the certificate authority, by supplying a public key 
and requesting a certificate. Application must be in person or by some secure 
authenticated communication. 
2. For participant A, the authority provides a certificate of form 
c 尸 五 风 j r ， / D 力 风 ] 
where KR^ ^^ ^ is the private key used by the authority. 
3. A sends the certificate to other participant, B. 
4. B reads the certificate using authority's public key KU_h，and then verifies it: 
ID A and KU „ are the certificate holder's information, and T verifies the 
currency of the certificate. 
Public- key distribution of secret keys 
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Although the public-key encryption has been widely accepted, and its advantages are 
also well known by users, such as more secure communication, foiling eavesdropping, 
tampering and so on. Because of its much lower calculating speed, few users wish to 
use it exclusively for communication. Then it is utilized as a vehicle for distribution 
of secret keys to secure the symmetric encryption in communication. 
Helping to key distribution for conventional encryption, the protocol is very 
simple to understand in [MERK79] - assume it is from AtoB: 
1. A generates a key pair of public/private keys, {KU"ICRJ, and transmits B a 
message including A's public key and identifier. 
2. B select a session key, K^，for upcoming use, and then encrypts using A's 
public key and sends it back to A. 
3. A recovers the secrete key by decrypting the message using his own private 
key. 
4. Both A and B start their encrypted communication using the session key K^， 
A's public and private keys are discardable. 
The idea of key distribution using public-key cryptography is simple but 
vulnerable. It is obviously weak to many attacks, including the-man-in-the-middle 
attack. In most cases, the simple method is improved by applying both confidentiality 
and authentication. This is suggested in [NEED78], using signature before encryption. 
Another proposed scheme of key distribution using public-key cryptography is a 
hybrid approach in IBM mainframe [LE93]. This hybrid scheme introduces the KDC 
again and has a three level authentication. 
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Chapter 4. 
A secure one-use dynamic backdoor 
password system based on Public Key 
Cryptography 
4.1 System objectives 
In Chapter 2, we have reviewed the conventional password authentication and some 
backdoor password authentication schemes. All of these schemes just invoke two 
parties: the user who holds the password or lost it, and the equipment that needs the 
password authentication. And the backdoor password authentication is considered to 
be secure on condition that both sides participate the process in person and the 
passwords will not leak to others while they are transferred in plaintext. 
Consequently, the conventional backdoor password authentication schemes 
have two major defects: 
• Only two parties are invoked, the relationship between two sides cannot be 
authenticated securely. 
Back to the case that a normal user lost his password, authentication is still 
performed by that the user is identified and confirmed as the legal user by the 
administrators and then he gets back what he has before. Here we can easily 
see that the authentication by some authority is still needed even in backdoor 
password systems. 
• Backdoor passwords are mostly well known or can be found in plaintext way. 
This is the cost to make a redundant administrative account besides who is 
authorized normally from the front door. Considering its security, 
cryptographic methods should be applied to the scheme to change this. 
• The backdoor account is just part of the user subsystem. 
In most backdoor password schemes, the backdoor account is just another 
administrative user, a duplicated super user. Part of the user subsystem, the 
backdoor account faces the same risk in against attacks as the normal users. 
But breaking a backdoor account gets more than you want; you will control 
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the whole system as a super user. Some changes should be considered to make 
the backdoor account away from the attacks on normal users. 
In the following sections of this chapter, a secure one-use dynamic backdoor 
password system based on public key cryptography will be proposed. This system 
will overcome the drawbacks in conventional backdoor password authentication 
schemes. Also the system analysis follows at the end of this chapter. 
To eliminate the weaknesses in the traditional backdoor password 
authentication systems, we may first become clear about the properties or objectives 
of our newly designed system: 
High Security 
From the information security point of view, handling all the stuff securely is the 
basic requirement to any system that is related to information storage and 
transmission. But the current backdoor password authentication methods are all far 
from this basis - The backdoor account and the password are printed in manuals, even 
published to WWW sites; The authentication process is carried out without 
notarization and witness. 
In our new design of password authentication system, we apply the public key 
cryptography technologies to the system to ensure the high security. For example, all 
the data streams are encrypted before sending to other parties involved in the 
communications; Digital signatures are necessary for identifications and 
authentications; Other cryptographic technologies are used to verify the consistence 
and correspondence. 
Joint generation 
We want to change the thing that the “administrator’，can use the backdoor at any time 
without any authentication on his identity or privilege to the certain systems. The term 
“joint，，means we get more parties involved to perform the multi-authentication. The 
guy who claims the "administrator" cannot use backdoor password as his wish 
individually. He needs to prove his privilege to the system, i.e., he has to be 
authenticated by another trusted party. With another party's cooperation, the 
authentication can continue. If all have been authenticated, the administrator's 
password will be reset by a new one generated by two sides together. Any one cannot 
perform this separately. 
One-time use 
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Additionally to multi-authentication, more should be done to secure the backdoor 
password. Making it dynamic or one-time use is a good idea. One-time use means the 
password for the backdoor account only works for this time and it will be invalid for 
next time logon the system because the system has changed it. 
This dynamic backdoor password will make the backdoor account protected 
securely. It makes the break on the backdoor account more difficult. Even worse, if 
used for this time, the backdoor password is overwritten by some random bits, it will 
be unable to trace it. And then it will slow the break against the backdoor account 
down to the brute-force attack, which is the most exhaustive one. 
Partial account 
All accounts are included in the user structure of a system. Regardless the privileges 
to the system resources, all accounts have some things in common. For example in an 
OS with user privileges, all accounts may have similar system environment, system 
context and system shell to make them work, even the accounts with the least 
privileges. 
And in most systems, backdoor accounts are part of system users. In order to 
have rights of controlling the system and reset the configurations of the system, most 
backdoor accounts belong to administrators group. That means the backdoor account 
of a system is just another legal administrator. Leaving such an administrative account 
with well-known password is too dangerous, maybe the worst case for a system 
administrator. But this does exist in our real world. 
We think the backdoor account should be quite different from others for its 
special purpose. And we need to make it more different — away from the user 
structure. If still use the user structure the account should be restricted toughly. 
Maybe this account can only do one thing, which is changing the front-door 
administrator's password. This is better than it is now in security. Or we can embed 
this account into the authentication procedure, which means this account and the 
backdoor password authentication are built inside the authentication process. We 
name this restricted account as partial account to distinguish from a general account. 
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4.2 Simple system and analysis 
4.2.1 System diagram 
To make a clear statement about the new conception, we first design a very simple 
system for principle. In our simple system, all elements are also included. Simplicity 
means just one member for each party. This simple system just solves a problem like 
this: The administrator lost the password of equipment that he managed. Instead of 
using the well-known backdoor password, he tries another secure way to reset his 
password without the risk to leak the whole process to others. 
Fig 4-1 shows the simple system. The meanings of notations in Fig 4-1 are 




� . . � � / 
Alice 
(Administrator) Fig 4-1 Simple system diagram 
Ellie Equipment whose administrative password has 
(Equipment) been lost or forgotten 
AJiice The administrative user of Ellie 
(Administrator) 
Mary 
Ellie's manufacturer or trusted third-party CA 
(Manufacturer) 
Table 4-1 Notations in Fig 4-1 
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4.2.2 System protocol 
Before describing how the whole system works, we must do some preparations to 
make the system reasonable. 
Preparations: 
1. Ellie interacts with Alice in plain text; 
2. Alice interacts with Mary in cryptographic way. They have shared a set of 
public keys between them — Alice has Mary's public key KUMI’ and Mary has 
Alice's, KUA; 
3. Ellie also have shared another set of public keys with each other - Ellie has 
Mary's public key KUm2 (different from the one Alice has), Mary has Ellie's, 
KUE. But they do not interact directly; 
The first preparation is easy to understand for Alice is the administrator of Ellie. She 
of course communicates with Ellie in traditional and plaintext way, via consoles, 
keyboards, disks and so on. This is a normal case for a system administrator. 
As noted, Mary can be the manufacturer of Ellie or a trusted third-party 
certificate authority. Then Alice needs to request to Mary to start the whole process to 
regain the rights to Ellie and Mary will have response to Alice. The communication 
between Mary and Alice must be in secure way against eavesdropping. In Public-key 
cryptosystems, keys are in pairs, the public key and the private key, noted as KU and 
KR respectively. The letter U and R are from the second letter of the word “Public，， 
and “Private，，for distinction. Also the keys' owner is briefly added in the subscript. 
For example, KUM means Mary's public key. There is assumption that Alice and 
Mary get the proper public keys securely beforehand. 
For more authentications, Ellie also shares another set of key pair with its 
manufacturer. This preparation is practical in real cases. All the manufacturers have 
necessary information of their products, SNs, model numbers for instance. Or a 
trusted third-party Certificate Agents (CA，s) have registered products' necessary 
information for further checking. On the other hand, the products storing 
manufacturers' information are also acceptable for the consumers. 
With the preparation, the followings are the system protocol, describing how 
our system for backdoor password works. This protocol can be briefly illustrated by 
the following figure, Fig 4-2: 
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Fig 4-2 Protocol for simple system 
Protocol: 
(1) Alice initializes a random string. In binary it can be thought as a 
random number r^, TQ e^ Z / . And input to Ellie to start the process. 
(2) With pre-processing on the input, Ellie makes another random binary 
number r,，r, e^ Z / . Ellie signs it as T^ using her private key KRe. 
Ellie feeds back all to Alice, r, || r^ ，where 
where the S^ {T) means the function that sign T with key K. 
Both r, and r^ are recorded by Ellie for further use. 
(3) Alice signs r, both and r^ with her private key KRa. Then she 
encrypts the signed message using Mary's public key KUMJ before 
sending to Mary: 
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^KUmS^ ^ II II S � 
where 
s = Skra II ^2) 
where E^ (T) means the function that encrypts r using key K. 
(4) When Mary gets the message sent from Alice, she decrypts it using her 
private key KRMI and verifies if it is sent by Alice using Alice's public 
key 肌： 
II r , 11 )^)) 
where {T) stands for the function that decrypts r using key K; and 
VK (S) means the verification on the signature of S using key K\ 
(5) Mary verifies if the message Alice sent to her is from Ellie using 
Ellie's public key AI/五： 
Then Mary generates T^，which is Hash value of ，noted 
as 二//(Ti). Mary signs it as T4 using another private key KRm2, 
which is part of the key pair shared with Ellie: 
『4= ‘ 们 ⑷ 
(6) Mary signs both R^ and R^ with her private key KRMI and then encrypts 
the signed message using Alice's public key KUA before sending to 
Alice: 
K^U^  (^ 3 II II 
where 
= 丨 MO 
(7) Alice decrypts the message and verifies Mary's signature, using her 
private key and Mary's public key respectively: 
(8) Alice puts tokens to Ellie using a highly restrict administrative account 
on Ellie. 
(9) The highly restrict administrative account involves a procedure to 
verify if the tokens are from Mary: 
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And also Ellie verifies if the tokens are in the same flow by testing the 
Hash value of T^ with T^ • Of course Ellie uses the same one-way Hash 
function as Mary used in (5). 
After verification using the four tokens, Ellie will allow this account to 
logon the system. But this account just can do one thing: change the 
administrative password. 
(10) Destroy the stored information and change the restrict account's 
password by overwriting with a random string to ensure only one-time 
use for this restrict account and avoid tracing its password. 
When the story starts, Alice has lost or forgotten her administrative password 
of Ellie. Then she tells Ellie “I lost administrative password，，，and then Ellie needs 
Alice to provide a random binary string, noted as T�. This binary string is an initiator, 
which will carry nothing but just an identity of Alice. 
This initial token is then processed by Alice to meet some requirement, for 
example, required fixed length. And the result is T^ • The process on the initiator will 
not remove off its representation of Alice's identity. Next, Ellie signs r, and the 
signature, named as ，is appended to . Then Ellie feeds back the combined 
message r^  || to Alice. Using Ellie's signature will involve Ellie into the 
authentication process. After signed, the message to Alice is unalterable, carrying 
both Alice's identity and information embedded by Ellie. Moreover, from preparation 
1 and 3，without Ellie's public key, Alice cannot verify this signature. Only Mary can 
do the signature verification to confirm if the message is processed by proper Ellie, 
not manipulated by Alice or someone else. 
To continue the process, Alice has to deliver the message to Mary for 
authentication. The communication between Alice and Mary is encrypted for 
confidentiality, and signature scheme is applied to the message for authentication. 
After Mary recovers the message from Alice, she has to verify the message 
contains Ellie's signature. By secure communication with Alice and verification on 
Alice's signature on the message, Mary can confirm the message is really from Alice. 
To fulfill the purpose, Mary needs to verify the fact that Alice really lost Ellie's 
password by checking the signature on the recovered message. If the proper signature 
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is verified, knowing that nobody else can alter or manipulate the message, Mary may 
find the truth. Then Mary will add her approval to the message for Ellie via Alice. In 
order to make the consistency with the information both delivered to and sent from 
Mary, she creates another string, ，related to r,by a Hash function. This one-way 
hash function will generate a relation between r^  and r^ for further verification of 
consistency. Also Mary signs r^ as to add information that this t^ is from her. For 
all the messages will be securely transferred to Alice, there is no need to add more 
encryption on the message for Ellie against others. After signed, the message cannot 
be altered even by Alice. 
After the message delivered securely to Alice, she does reverse to recover the 
message and verify Mary's signature for authentication. Then she needs to provide the 
message of || r^ to Ellie, of which she forgot the administrative password. This 
time, Ellie will invoke a procedure to do the verifications. First, she will test if the 
message provided by Alice is from Mary by verifying the Mary's signature of [ . 
Then she also tests the consistency of process by testing the relation between r^  and 
2-3 to see if r^ = Hir^) • If pass the test, it means all four tokens are in the same flow, 
not recombined by different processes intentionally. If passing all verifications, Ellie 
will reset the backdoor account's password with the combination of r � a n d T^ . Then 
Alice can logon to the system via a strongly restricted account or even just inside the 
verification procedure to change the super-user's password. The restricted user is not 
a part of users subsystem, without any user's properties like working environment and 
privileges. The account can do only one thing — changing the administrator's 
password besides exit the whole process. 
Successfully changing the administrative password, Alice gains the privileges 
back. Some work need to do to achieve the maximum security. The stored tokens are 
overwritten by random bits instead of deleted; if the restricted account still has 
password record in system, it also needs to be updated by overwritten a random bits. 
All the work will make the backdoor one-time use and the password is untraceable. 
4.2.3 Applied technologies 
Reviewing the system structure and the protocol, we know that three major 
cryptographic technologies are involved: one-way Hash function, digital signature and 
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public key encryption. Overviews of them are introduced in Chapter 2. In this section, 
applicable algorithms are explained, with their cryptanalysis followed next. 
One-way Hash function - MD5 
In system protocol, Step 5, one-way Hash function is adopted to “create，，some 
relation between r^  and for the further authentication and “hide，，the original 
information . 
Here we propose the MD5 algorithm applied as the Hash function. Although 
there are many algorithms invented by researchers and MD5 is not the fastest one, it is 
the most commonly used in many operation systems for the integrity check. Using 
MD5 algorithm, this system can be more easily implemented in some operation 
platform. 
MD5 algorithm is an enhanced version of MD4 proposed by R. L. Rivest in 
RFC 1321. The detail description of MD5 algorithm can be found in the Appendix. 
Digital Signature - DSA 
In order to authenticate between Ellie, Alice and Mary, digital signature scheme is 
adopted in this system. Since some of the practical digital signature schemes are 
similar. They are just some examples of a general digital signature scheme based on 
Discrete Logarithm Problem. We have discussed this in previous chapters. In this 
thesis, Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) adopted in Digital Signature Standard 
(DSS) is applied in this system. 
The DSS was proposed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) in Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) PUB 186 in 1991. And it 
was revised in 1993，again in 1996. 
In the Appendix B, you may find the algorithm in detail, or you may refer to 
the brief introduction in section 3.6. 
Public key encryption 一 RSA 
The information exchanged in this system is confidential to others; so encrypted 
communication is preferred to ensure the basic security. Since RSA is the only widely 
accepted and implemented in public key encryption since it was developed by Ron 
Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman in 1977. RSA is what we proposed to apply in 
our system. 
Concepts of public key cryptography have been introduced in Chapter 3. You 
may refer to Appendix C for detail RSA algorithm. 
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4.2.4 System security analysis 
After describing our system and introducing the applied technologies in detail, in this 
section system security analysis focuses on both in the system design and in applied 
cryptography schemes. Also the system complexity will be also studied as the system 
evaluation. 
Security of applied technologies 
The applied technologies are the foundations of this system design. Security of these 
technologies will affect the whole system. So they are of importance to be firstly 
focused. 
• Security of MD5 
For Hash functions, different messages are transferred to message digests in 
fix length. Each bit in the Hash value of a message is a function of every bit in 
the input; i.e. the result is well mixed. For bit pattern padding and message 
length padding, messages even just with 1 bit difference will make totally 
different Hash value. 
The author of MD5，Rivest claimed in the RFC that the algorithm is as strong 
as possible for the 128-bit Hash value. The difficulty of two messages having 
the same digest is on the order of operations. And the difficulty of finding 
a message with a given digest is on the order of operations. 
In cryptographic point of view, MD5 must be considered as vulnerable to 
brute-force attack. It is much worse to birthday attacks on order of efforts of 
264. There were some attempts on attacking the algorithm in the past years. 
The most successful attack is generating a collision for the MD5 compression 
function - Another message were found to generate the same output for the 
operation performed in one round in the main loop. But the chaining variables 
are not relative to the initial value o f^ , B, C, D involved in the algorithm. The 
attack is success to the compression function instead of MD5. Till now, there 
is no practical attack that can impact on the security ofMDS. 
• Security of DSA 
For this digital signature algorithm, two aspects are more concerned on its 
security. One is the one-way Hash function adopted in the algorithm; the other 
is the infeasibility of calculating k. 
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Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) is used to produce the message digest in DSA. 
And using SHA, the Hash value of the message is 160 bits in length, which is 
much longer than 128 bits in MD5. There is no much comparable aspects 
between MD5 and SHA because the latter is another enhancement to MD4. 
But the 160-bit result is more resistant to brute-force attacks, including 
birthday attack. 
The randomly generated key k per message is another problem. Because of the 
difficulty of computing discrete logarithm, k is hard to be calculated from r 
even with the global components. But the randomness is of importance for the 
signature, which will emphasize the strength of the random number 
generator's design. If the random number generator is not designed properly, 
others can recover the sender's private key x，by exploiting its pseudo-random 
properties. Even worse, if duplicated ks are used, others can recover the 
private key jc easily, which will lead to undetectable signature forgeries. 
• Security of RSA 
Possible attacks on RSA may be from brute-force attack, mathematical attack 
and protocol attack. 
Brute-force attack will try all possible private keys, the same as it applies to 
any other cryptographic algorithms. And the defense against it is also the same 
—just increase the key space to cause the computational difficulty in each 
trying. Because of the complexity of the algorithms, both in key generation 
and encryption/decryption, the calculation will be time-consuming. The larger 
size of the keys, the less efficient the attack will be. 
There are some other attacks against RSA focus on the algorithm, and they 
are equivalent to factoring n-a large number with prime factors. Technically, 
this factoring is a hard problem as the large size of n. But with the capability 
of computation increasing so fast, larger size of key is also needed to 
strengthen the secure of this de-factoring. To avoid n may be factored more 
easily, some constrains have been suggested to apply on p and q by the 
algorithm's inventors. 
Other approaches attack against the implementation of RSA instead of the 
basic algorithms. But these attacks just tell us RSA is not once for all, much 
more should be done with it. For example, you'd better not sign any 
documents from strangers for that may facilitate chosen ciphertext attack; or 
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never share the same n among different group of users to avoid common 
modulus attack on RSA. 
Security of system design 
More than the security of the basic algorithms adopted in the system, the 
implementation of it should be also concerned to avoid being attacked on the protocol. 
In this section, some cases are studied to evaluate what will harm to the system 
security and possible solutions are also provided. 
參 Token lost attack 
Users always forget passwords as often as they loose them. And two hazards 
will affect them: one is to reveal their identities; the other of course may cause 
direct loss to their password-protected stuffs. 
But in our system, multi-parties are involved, none of two parties could fulfill 
the system functions separately. Also, all the tokens are lost and gathered by 
the same person is in less possibility. Even the guy got all the tokens, maybe 
stole, he must know what those token are for, how to use them and where to 
use. Hence, token lost will not cause the second hazard to the token owners on 
condition that Alice is as careful as possible to protect all the tokens. For all 
tokens are handled by her. In security systems, protocols are designed to 
protect something. If the people who carrying out the protocols are not careful 
enough or even are not trustable, then the security means nothing. 
If some one get Alice's lost tokens, says r, and T” he cannot gain any good 
from that because he cannot forge the signature of Alice and continue the 
authentication process. 
• Token spoofing attack 
If do not considering the signature forgeries, can anybody make his own token 
pair to deceive Mary? 
The answer is no. The token pair (-”^“？) is with Ellie's signature using her 
private key. With her signature, two things are brought to the token pairs: 
identity and integrity. 
Ellie's signature is part of the token pair, so the signature verification could 
identify if the tokens are from the proper party. If someone what to forge the 
tokens with proper consistency, he must recover Ellie's private key which will 
be hard work. 
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On the other hand, in digital signature schemes, Hash value of the message to 
be signed is involved, so the integrity can be guaranteed. If someone want to 
forge the tokens by modifying parts of them, the integrity of the token pair 
will be destroyed, and easily detected in Mary when verifying the signature of 
Ellie. 
• Man-in-the-middle attack 
Interaction between Alice and Ellie are face-to-face, assume there is no 
interception in the interaction. But most interceptions happen between Alice 
and Mary. The interceptor doesn't focus on the crack on the algorithms but 
acts as a double-faced guy: to Ellie, he pretends to be Alice; to Alice, he 
pretends to be Ellie. This guy intercepts in the communication between Alice 
and Ellie. In the key exchange, he intercepts Alice's and sends his own public 
key to Ellie; the same thing he does to Alice. Then all the messages are 
encrypted in his public key and can be read and manipulated by the interceptor. 
He will get everything and is not easy to detect. 
But fortunately, there was something to eliminate this. The Interlock Protocol, 
invented by two of the authors of RSA, Ron Rivest and Adi Shamir, can foil 
this attack. The idea of the Interlock Protocol is very simple, just split the 
encrypted message into two parts and send them separately. Because of half of 
the encrypted message cannot recover half of the message, the interceptor 
must invent a new message to continue the process if he doesn't want to be 
detected. That is much harder than ciphertext attack, with just half of the 
useless ciphertext. Then the attack is foiled. 
4.3 Multi-user system and analysis 
In section 4.1, we describe our newly designed backdoor password system in a simple 
way in detail to state the principle. As to practical cases, an administrator may manage 
many equipment having password systems. How to distinct which is which? It seems 
that IDs attached to the equipment are enough to tell them separately. But cases are 
more complicated than that, what about there are many administrators? This is very 
normal in real cases; for example, CISCO Inc. has many clients who own their 
products more than one piece. Nevertheless, new relations among the administrators 
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and the manufacturers will be created when considering multi-user mode. Verification 
on these relations is also needed in the procedure. 
Till now, three new questions need to consider in the complicated system of 
multi-user mode: 
1. How to distinct different equipment? Back to the notations in section 4.1, the 
problem is: How to identify different Ellie? 
2. How to distinct different legal administrative users? Or how to tell which 
Alice she is? 
3. How to verify the relations between the administrative users and the 
equipment? This question is to verify if an Alice has the proper request for 
backdoor password authentication and does not pretend or be pretended? In a 
secure system, this is more concerned. 
Consequently, the system protocol should be adjusted considering the 
problems. And the system structure should be completed according the modification 
to the system protocol, more members in each party. 
4.3.1 Modification to the system diagram 
In the multi-user mode, there are many Alice's who manage many Ellie's. Then the 
relations become complicated, shown as Fig 4-3. 
Mary 
Alicei Alice2 • • • Alice. 
曰lie 曰丨ie.。 • • • 曰丨ie 
i.1 1.2 '.J 
Fig 4-3 Modified system diagram for multi-user mode 
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Similar to Table 4.1, notations in Fig 4.3 are listed in Table 4.2. 
Mary Ellie's manufacturer or trusted third-party CA 
Alicci The /-th registered administrator 
Ellieij They-th equipment managed by Alicci 
Table 4-2 Notations in Fig 4.3 
Note that i and j in Table 4.2 are just for counting, without ordering meaning. 
And each path from an Ellie to Mary abides the protocol to be described in detail in 
the next section. 
4.3.2 Modification to the system protocol 
For the problems brought by changing the system into multi-user mode, we have to do 
some modifications to the system protocol, including the preparations. 
Modified Preparations: 
1. Alice stores her public key in Ellie. 
2. Ellie interacts with Alice in plaintext way. 
3. Alice communicates with Mary still in a secure way — Alice has Mary's public 
key and Mary has Alice's. The key pairs are (KUAi’ KRAI) and {KUMJ, KRMI). 
4. Ellie exchanges information with Mary indirectly but securely. Ellie has 
Mary's another public key KUM2, which is different with the public key, KUMI, 
shared with any Alice. On the other hand, Mary also has every Ellie's public 
key, KUE. 
5. Each Ellie has a unique ID recorded by Mary and the ID is linked to her public 
key, KUE. 
Comparing with the simple single user mode, all parties need to prepare more. 
First before the equipment starts to work, the administrator needs to input her public 
key to Ellie. This is for verification of Alice's identity and against unauthorized 
request, which will be discussed later. Of course Alice will not have the public key of 
Ellie that is up to her management. Alicei needs to store her public key to all Ellieij. 
This should be regarded as an initialization. For example, if equipment is transferred 
to others, changing the administrator, new super user's public key also needs to store 
into it. 
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Then some necessary work needs to be done, similar to the single user mode: 
Alice has a secure communication channel with Mary by sharing a set of key pair; 
Ellie does the same thing as Alice, but she will not interact with Mary directly. 
Authentication between Ellie and Mary is carried by Alice. 
Because much equipment is involved, for fast indexing at Mary side, a 
database of the products is needed. Some information about the Ellie's is stored， 
together with the IDs, which is related to their public key. This ID may speed the 
process as an identity of Ellie when Mary gets a request. Also this ID may help in 
authentication too, which is in the discussion in system protocol for multi-user mode. 
The following figure Fig 4-4 is to show the system protocol in multi-user mode. 
日 lie Alice Mary 
(2) T, E^ Z : 
II ‘ — • 
ID\\ r, II Tj II s 
• ？ 
T, <-H(T,) (5) 





Fig 4-4 Protocol for multi-user system 
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Modified Protocol: 
(1) Alice initializes a random binary string, noted as T^ GJ^ Z„，as 
an input to Ellie to start the process. 
(2) After pre-processing, Ellie reformats r � a s r , , T^ g^  ZJ , according 
to the system requirements. Then she signs r, using her private key 
KRE together with her ID and her administrator's public key stored, 
KUAi. And then she appends the signed string as t^ to the end of 
combined message of ID || T^ : 
\\KUJ 
where the {T) means the function that sign T with key K. 
Both and T^ are recorded by Ellie for further use. 
The final messages fed to Alice is: 
T, �2 = SkRe II II KU^ i) 
(3) After getting the message provided by Ellie，Alice signs it with her 
private key KRA. Then she encrypts the signed message using Mary's 
public key KUMI before sending to Mary: 
丑〜(释J M � 
where 
5 = � ( 7 D | | r i II r , ) 
where 五欠(T) means the function that encrypts 7 using key K. 
(4) When Mary gets the message sent from Alice, she decrypts it using 
her private key KMRJ and verifies if it is sent by Alice using Alice's 
public key KAU-
where (T) stands for the function that decrypts T using key K\ 
VK (S) means the signature verification process on message S using 
keyK 
(5) After Mary looking up Ellie's public key via the encapsulated ID, 
she will do verifications on all the elements: 
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今 Verifies ID consists with what inside of the signature. 
今 Verifies the relation between and . 
今 Verifies the consistency of the encapsulated Alice's public key. 
If all pass, Mary will then confirm that this message is from Ellie 
instead of a fake message. And relation between Alice and Ellie is 
also verified as true. 
Then Mary generates r^ ，which is a Hash value of z^，noted as 
Then Mary signs it together with Alice's public key again as r^ 
using another private key KRMI, which is part of the key pair shared 
with Ellie: 
(6) Mary signs both R^ and R^ with her private key KRMI and then 
encrypts the message with the signature using Alice's public key 
KUA before sending to Alice: 
EjoJa (^ 3 II II 
where 
S = II rj 
This step is just the counterpart of StepS. 
(7) After Alice gets the message, she decrypts it and verifies Mary's 
signature, using her private key and Mary's public key respectively: 
厂你,丨(�(五仍>1 II Ik))) 
(8) Till now Alice gets T^ and T^ . She puts these tokens to Ellie using a 
highly restrict administrative account on Ellie. 
(9) A highly restrict administrative account involves a procedure to 
verify the followings: 
今 Together with stored Alice's public key, verifies the signature 
of T^ II using proper public key shared with Mary. 
今 Verifies if T^ = ，where the r, is pre-stored in step (2). 
� 3 is from the input. 
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(10) If all verifications processed successfully, the backdoor account's 
password in Ellie will be reset to the combination of r^ and r^. 
Alice is permit to logon using this backdoor account and do the only 
thing 一 change administrator's password. All stored information 
during the procedure will be overwritten by random bits If the restrict 
account has password file, and then the same thing should be done to 
avoid tracing its password. 
Similarly to the simple system described in section 4.2.2，at the very 
beginning, an Alice tells one of her Ellie's, “I lost administrative password", and then 
the Ellie needs Alice to provide a random string, noted as r^. This initial token is 
processed by Alice to meet some requirement, for example, required fix length. And 
the result is . This is the same as that in simple system. 
For convenience, we just remove the subscript of “i，，when we don not 
mention distinguishing different Alice's. 
In order to identify her administrator against others, more information about 
both Ellie and Alice needs to be carried to Mary. So together with Ellie's ID and her 
administrator's public key, Ellie sign the combined message as T^，and then append it 
to ID II Tj. The message fed back to Alice will look like this: 
刷 “ 释 J 肌 J 
Because Mary knows Alicei's public key when verifying her signature in the 
following steps, Ellie needs not carry this public key in the message. Also, the 
signature contains more than the message itself, which makes the signature scheme 
harder to break even for brute-force attack. 
Then the message is returned to Alice, Alice has to transfer the whole message 
securely to Mary without any alteration. Signing the message using her private key 
KRR first, Alice then encrypts the message using Mary's public key KUMI and sends 
to Mary. And at Mary's side, reverse procedure is carried out to recover the message 
—decrypts using Mary's private key KRMI and then verifies Alice's signature using 
Alice's public key KUA . 
Then the next step is very important, consisting verification and manipulation. 
From the message, Mary can find out the corresponding public key belonging to the 
Ellie via ID. Because she has known that the message is from Alice, then she will 
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append Alice's public key to the first part of the message to make the original 
message for signature verification. Using Ellie's public key Klh, she verifies the 
signature of ID || t^ || K臉 confirming the consistencies of all elements by one step 
verification. The consistency between ID and the part inside the signature, together 
with the one of the Tokenl, confirms the message is really from Ellie. The 
consistency between the encapsulated Alice's public key and the one Mary used for 
decryption confirms the relations between the Ellie and the Alice. Altogether, Mary 
now confirms that Alice really lost the administrative password of Ellie, and she is the 
right super user of the certain Ellie. 
After the verification, Mary needs to return some approval to Alice. She will 
then generate another string using Hashing functions based on r � a s input. The Hash 
value is noted as T^ . This is for two purposes: One is to deliver the approval; the other 
is to create a fingerprint to ensure that is in the same flow. Then Mary needs 
to sign together with Alice's public key again using another private key shared 
with Ellie, because she wants only Ellie can verifies that the message is from her and 
consistency of Alice's public key. The result is produced as T^ . 
= SKRmi (^ 3 II ^ AUi) 
Now it is time to send all the necessary information back to Alice. Mary signs 
the message of r^ || r^ and then encrypts it to send to Alice. This stage is quite 
complicated, so we can describe it in graphical way in Fig 4-5 
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Authentication Pre-handling for the next stage 
Fig 4-5 Work flow diagram for this stage 
Then Alice decrypts the message and then verifies Mary's signature to ensure 
that the message is really from Mary. After that, Alice needs to input the entire 
recovered message to Ellie to finish the rest. 
After Ellie gets the message from Alice, she will do some verification. First, 
she appends the stored Alice's public key to T^ to verify the signature of Mary. This 
will confirm that the message is really from Mary, not anyone else. Also, this can 
verify that the message is input by the right Alice, not other Alice from the 
consistency of the stored Alice's public key and the one used for right decrypted 
message. And also Ellie verifies if the tokens are in the same flow by testing the Hash 
value of Ti with T^ . Of course Ellie uses the same one-way Hash function as Mary 
used in (5). Verifying the hash relation may confirm two things: One is the message is 
from Mary; the other is that the tokens are in the same flow, not break-and-
recombined. The verification of Ellie may be illustrated by Fig 4-6. 
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Fig 4-6 Work flow diagram for this stage 
Ellie successfully verifies all the consistency, she may allow Alice to enter the 
system with a strongly restricted administrative user to change administrator's 
password. When the restricted user logouts, all information recorded in the whole 
procedure will be destroyed by overwriting with random bits. If the restricted user 
also has encrypted password file or something similar, random bits are also applied to 
it to make it untraceable against password break. This will ensure the one-time of the 
backdoor account. But we strongly suggest using a partial account discussed in 
Section 4.4. 
4.3.3 System analysis for multi-user system 
As many legal Alice's exist as well as many Ellie's in the system, the multi-user 
system is more complicated than the one mentioned previously to state the system 
principle. Most of security problems still affect the multi-user system, such as the lost 
token attack and the man-in-the-middle attack. These problems appear in each 
communication link between any two parties in both simple system and multi-user 
system. This section will not cover these problems again. More users involved and 
more relations introduced, some of problems change or new problems appear, such as 
the spoofing token attack. 
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After reviewing the modified protocol for the multi-user system, we can 
conclude that no more technologies are applied except the identification scheme. And 
the identification scheme is introduced to identify different users of course; help to 
ensure the information integrity and resist some possible attacks involved legal users. 
At Mary side, each Ellie's ID has been recorded, say in database, before the 
equipment is delivered to the customer. This database is similar to the Key Database 
in purpose, but is not public to others, especially to Alice. The hide Ellie's public key 
is another benefit comparing to identifying each Ellie by this database. 
Here, we check the message again to see what the adjustment will help to the 
integrity: 
^ = Skre 例I [ II KUA丨) 
In T2，there contains the signature of the combined messages. This combined 
message includes Ellie's ID, Tokenl and the public key Alice stored in Ellie. But only 
part of it is released in the message fed back to Alice for the unreleased part is known 
to the verifier Mary. In doing this way, the signature becomes more complicated and 
not more effort is brought to the verification. But to the hostile interceptors, it brings 
much more difficulty in modifying the message and keeping the consistency as well. 
Without the unknown part, the signature is totally different. If the public keys are just 
published to those who are involved, i.e., the KU^^ is another secret to the 
interceptors, the integrity of the message will be in higher secure status. 
In multi-user system, identification is a major problem. As to the security of 
the multi-user system, token spoofing attack becomes more difficult for the reason 
mentioned above - more difficulty in manipulating the messages. And also they 
cannot break the signature scheme required between Alice and Mary. Most serious 
problem now is how to prevent the unauthorized control - not the hostile interceptor 
but the different Alice want to gain access to the control of Ellie's not belong to her. 
In another words, Alicci pretends to lost the administrative password of Elliej,i which 
is belongs to Alice�. Because all Alice's have the key pairs shared with Mary, to Mary 
all Alice's are legal administrative users. Mary cannot tell the proper relations 
between some Alice and Ellie's by the protocol introduced in Section 4.2. Some 
adjustments are applied to enable Mary can tell this problem via verification the 
messages. These adjustments include the assumption 1，Alice's public key is stored in 
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her Ellie; and the Ellie feeds back the message and the combined signature containing 
the stored public key. If unauthorized Alice! starts the procedure at Elliej,!, she will get 
the feedback message. But this message contains the signature of IDj ^ || || KU^j. 
For the complexity of this signature, Alicci cannot recover the Elliej,rs private key to 
resign IDj ^ || KU • And of course she could not sign the message with Alice/s 
private key to make a 100% phony message. If AlicCi cannot resign the message to 
encapsulate her own public key, she has to sign the message using her own private 
key. When the message reaches Mary, this inconsistency will be detected when 
verifying the public key using to decrypt the message with the public key 
encapsulated in the signature. 
4.4 Applicable modes and analysis 
In previous sections, both simple system and multi-user system are discussed in 
protocols and system analyses. Both systems have three parties involved: Alice or 
Alice's, Ellie or Ellie's and Mary. Interactions among the three parties are concerned 
and different applicable working modes and their security problems will be studied in 
this section. 
Console mode 
As in the preparations in both two systems, the interaction between Alice and Ellie is 
face-to-face, which means Alice must be at present, sitting before Ellie, requesting the 
start-up by inputting information to Ellie and getting feedback from Ellie. This kind of 
working mode is named as “Console Mode，，，representing the user must be at present, 
working before the console. 
From point of view of security, there is no place to be secure enough. This 
console mode is definitely with problems. The followings are major problems and 
how our system resists them. 
• Restricted backdoor account 
In most system with backdoor password, the backdoor account is used to gain 
the control of the system. The in most cases it is just another administrative 
user of the system with the same privilege as the super user. And he has the 
same properties according to the system's user framework. And another worse 
thing is that most of those backdoor accounts' passwords are well known. That 
backdoor account is a user makes it is easy to be broken in console or even 
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through network; the well-know backdoor password makes the backdoor open 
to all. 
Similar to other backdoor password system, there is a backdoor account 
performing all the things to gain the control of the system. But unlike other 
systems, the backdoor account is a restricted partial account. This account is 
so restricted that he has no environment, no home directory, no read and write 
to other things. The only things this account can do are: complete the 
authentication procedure and reset the administrator's password. This account 
is much simpler than any other. It is in fact a partial account and its logon and 
functions can be integrated in the logon procedure now existing in most 
systems. The restriction on the functions makes the user less possible to be 
harmful to the system when working properly; its partial account property 
make it safe from attacking to get advantage of user privileges. 
• Secure TTY 
TTY originated for teletypewriter, a kind of input and output interface of 
computer. But now the TTY can refer any input and output devices, keyboard, 
monitor, modem and etc. The console mode needs the keyboard, the displayer 
and even other devices if necessary. But unfortunately, the communication 
among this set of TTYs are not safe. It can be easily wiretapped by the 
programs running in other TTYs or even virtual TTYs. This is a common 
security problem for all multi user systems. 
In order to make sure that the interactions between Alice and Ellie is 
"invisible" to others, character-streaming encryption is preferred. 
• Social Engineering 
For the console mode happens at the place where the equipment locates, more 
should be done to ensure this mode is safe enough in rather than cryptographic 
way. Security problems in Social Engineering are most in the policies of 
management, personnel and operations. These aspects are not cryptographic 
technologies related but maybe more dangerous than any attack from the 
enemies in cryptographic field. 
So, put the essential equipment in safe place against dusts, humidity and other 
harmful natural factors. This is the fundamental requirement for them. And 
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first of remaining is to make them unreachable to other unrelated users, only 
accessible to the real administrators. 
Online mode and Offline mode 
As we know, the communications between Alice and Mary are encrypted in the 
system to make sure of the information exchange is secure even in insecure channel. 
The communications can also be carried on in two ways - online mode and offline 
mode, each of them has its own pros and cons. Online mode means all the information 
is exchanged through network; offline mode means all information is carried in 
physical media and fetched by hands. 
Of course the online mode requires the network connection to Mary and Mary 
also has the proper server program to handle this issue. It is very fast and easy to 
process the whole function via network. The convenience and fast speed are the major 
benefits the online mode can provide. On the other hand, the open of the network will 
bring more insecure factors to the communications. For example, the ciphertext can 
be captured by anyone he wants to do so. As we have considered the factors when we 
do the system design, the online mode is what we suggest to make advantage of the 
networks. 
If the time is not your major problem and you want to see the maximum 
security on this issue, you may choose the offline mode as any traditional paper-work 
authentications. A trustful man is sent to fetch the encrypted information to Mary and 
Mary also has some guys to handle the information and give him the feedback. Then 
the feedback is brought to you and you can continue the process. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we proposed a backdoor authentication system based on the public key 
cryptography. This system design is totally different with any current backdoor 
authentication schemes. This system is more secure than traditional schemes and the 
authentication is dynamically processed for one-time use. The partial account is 
harder to trace than in the current systems. Both principle and practical system are 
introduced, together with the system analysis. 
As to implement of a practical system to replace the current backdoor 





With the information technology flies, more and more daily lives move into digital 
world. Information security becomes the first focus in people's digital daily lives by 
providing security services. System administrators become more and more important 
in responsibility for the management and maintenance of the information systems. But 
human does less accuracy than machines; backdoor password systems are widely used 
in many systems with password authentication. Hence more security problems about 
the current backdoor authentication systems should be paid attention to. 
Most authentication systems with backdoors are now using the same method 
to allow the super user to enter the system with weaker authentication than normal 
user. More and more security problems are revealed, including some products from 
world well know companies. 
In this thesis, we suggest to solve the forgotten password problem in a totally 
different way. We apply the public key cryptography onto the backdoor 
authentications. In our system proposed in this thesis, more parties are involved to 
fulfill the backdoor password authentication and more identities and administrative 
relations are verified. Not only the administrator's identity to the system needs to be 
verified, but also the identity to the manufacturer. This multi-authentication may 
strengthen the security of backdoor password authentication. This point is totally 
different from traditional backdoor authentication systems, which lessen the security 
strength. Moreover, in this thesis, a conception about a partial backdoor account is 
proposed, which can be utilized in most current systems. With this partial backdoor 
account, it will change the weakness in backdoor password authentication systems. 
Also this partial account is part of our system design. 
Additional to the principle, this thesis also provides a rough practical multi-
user system with detail protocol. In this system, some security problems are 
considered together with system analysis. And the system design is immune to those 
attacks mentioned in the thesis. Of course, it overcomes the defects in traditional 
backdoor password authentication systems. 
Comparing to the traditional backdoor password authentication system, our 
system design will have properties of: 
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• More secure with multi-authentication 
• One-time use 
• Dynamically processed 
• Less problem with partial account 
To conclude, because of the importance of our information system and 
security problems in traditional backdoor password authentication methods, we 
should improve current systems into a more secure one. And the system proposed in 
our thesis may be a candidate. 
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Appendix 
A. Algorithm of MD5 
Preparations: 
1. Padding the message so that its length is just 64 bits short of being multiple of 512. The 
padding pattern is 1000...0, the number of 0-bit is as many as needed. 
2. Appending a 64-bit representation of the message's original length. 
3. Four 32-bit Chaining Variables are initialized: 
A = 0x01234567 
B = 0x89abcdef 
C = 0xfedcba98 
D = 0x76543210 
Main loop: 
Input: Chaining Variables: A, 8’ C and D; 
512-bit message block in 16 32-bit sub-blocks: Mj, j = 0, 1... 15; 
Output: Updated A, 8，C, and D; 
Procedure: Four similar rounds perform nonlinear functions on the Chaining Variables 
and the message blocks; 
Bit-addition to the original Chaining Variables as the output result; 
Before the algorithm starts, some initial process should be done to the message 
together with some preparation. Those are for making the message length an exact 
multiple of 512 bits in length and ensuring different messages will not look the same 
after padding. 
And then the main loop begins. This loop continues for as many 512-bit 
blocks as are in the message. Four similar rounds are included in the main loop; each 
of them performs different operations 16 times. In each operation, a nonlinear 
function is applied on three of four variables, and the corresponding variables are 
replaced respectively. Fig A-1 shows the whole main loop. 
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f Message Block j 
k -n H ~ ~ ^ ^ ^ ~ ~ • T ^ : A 
g " I • Round 1 ^ Round 2 = Round 3 g Round 4 g 
D - — 口 i r ^ - ^ D I i 
Fig A-1 Main loop ofMDS algorithm 
There are four nonlinear functions, one used in each operation in each round: 
FiA,B,Q = (AaB)^/ ((-lA) A C) 
G(A, B，Q = (AaC)V(BA (iC)) 
/ / ( j , 5，C ) = j④ 5㊉ C 
I(A,B,C) = Be(Av(^C)) 
(© is XOR, A is AND, v is OR, and -. is NOT, all are bit-wise logic operation.) 
These functions are introduced to make corresponding bits of A, B, C and D 
are independent and unbiased. Then the result will have independent and unbiased 
bits. 
If Mj represents the >th sub-block of the message (/ = 0, 1，…，15)，and « s 
represent left shift of s bits, the four operations are: 
FF(A,B,C,D,Mj,s,t.) ^ = + + F{B,C,D) + Mj +1.) « s) 
GGiA,B,C,D,MJ,s,t.) A = B-h((A + G(B,C,D) + Mj +1.) « s ) 
HH{A,B,C,D,MJ,s,t.) A = B + ((A + H(B,C,D) + Mj +) « s) 
II{A,B,C,D,Mj,s山、 A = B + ((A + I(B,C,D) + Mj +1.) « s) 
And the constants, ti, are chosen as follows: 
In step /，ti is the integer part of 2^^*abs(sin(/)), where i is in radius. 
And the four rounds (64 steps in total) look like: 
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Round 1: 
FF (A, B, C, D, Mo, 7, 0xd76aa478) 
FF (D, A, B, C, Mi, 12，0xe8c7b756) 
FF (C, D, A, B, M2，17，0x242070db) 
FF (B, C, D, A, Ms, 22, Oxdbdceee) 
FF (A, B, C, D, M4, 7，0xf57c0faf) 
FF (D, A, B，C, M5，12，0x4787c62a) 
FF (C, D, A, B, Me，17，0xa8304613) 
FF (B, C, D, A, My, 22, 0xfd469501) 
FF (A, 8 , C , D, Ms, 7 , 0x698098d8) 
FF (D, A, B, C, Mq, 12，0x8b44f7af) 
FF (C, D, A, B, M10, 17, Ox冊5bb1) 
FF (B, C , D, A, M11, 2 2 , 0x895cd7be) 
FF (A, B, C, D，Mi2, 7, 0x6b901122) 
FF (D, A, B, C, MI3, 12，0xfd987193) 
FF (C, D, A, B, Mu, 17，0xa679438e) 
FF (B, C, D, A, Mi5, 22, 0x49b40821) 
Round 2: 
GG (A, B, C, D, Mi, 5, 0xf61e2562) 
GG (D, A, B, C, Me, 9，0xc040b340) 
GG (C, D，A, 8，M11, 14, 0x265e5a51) 
GG (B, C, D，A, Mo, 20, 0xe9b6c7aa) 
GG (A, B，C, D, Ms, 5，0xd62f105d) 
GG (D, A, B, C, M10, 9, 0x02441453) 
GG (C, D, A, B, MI5, 14’ 0xd8a1e681) 
GG (B, C, D, A, M4, 20, 0xe7d3fbc8) 
GG (A, B, C, D, M9, 5, 0x21e1cde6) 
GG (D, A, B, C, Mu, 9, 0xc33707d6) 
GG (C, D, A, B, M3, 14, 0xf4d50d87) 
GG (B, C, D, A, Ms, 20, 0x455a14ed) 
GG (A, B, C, D, MI3, 5, 0xa9e3e905) 
GG (D, k, B, C, M2, 9，0xfcefa3f8) 
GG (C, D, k, B，Mj, 14，0x676f02d9) 
GG (B, C, D, A, Mi2, 20, 0x8d2a4c8a) 
Round 3: 
HH (A, B, C, D，Ms, 4, 0xfffa3942) 
HH (D, A, B, C, Ms, 11, 0x8771f681) 
HH (C, D, A, a, Mu, 16，0x6d9d6122) 
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HH (B, C, 0, A, M14, 23, Oxfde5380c) 
HH (A, B, C, 0, M1, 4, Oxa4beea44) 
HH (0, A, B, C, M4, 11, Ox4bdecfa9) 
HH (C, 0, A, B, M7, 16, Oxf6bb4b60) 
HH (B, C, 0, A, M10, 23, Oxbebfbc70) 
HH (A, B, C, 0, M13, 4, Ox289b7ec6) 
HH (0, A, B, C, Mo, 11, Oxeaa127fa) 
HH (C, 0, A, B, M3, 16, Oxd4ef3085) 
HH (B, C, 0, A, M6, 23, Ox04881 d05) 
HH (A, B, C, 0, Mg, 4, Oxd9d4d039) 
HH (0, A, B, C, M12, 11, Oxe6db9ge5) 
HH (C, 0, A, B, M15, 16, Ox1fa27cf8) 
HH (B, C, 0, A, M2, 23, Oxc4ac5665) 
Round 4: 
11 (A, B, C, 0, Mo, 6, Oxf4292244) 
11 (0, A, B, C, M7, 10, Ox432aff97) 
11 (C, 0, A, B, M14, 15, Oxab9423a7) 
11 (B, C, 0, A, M5, 21, Oxfc93a039) 
11 (A, B, C, 0, M12, 6, Ox655b59c3) 
11 (0, A, B, C, M3, 10, Ox8fOccc92) 
11 (C, 0, A, B, M10, 15, Oxffeff47d) 
11 (B, C, 0, A, M1, 21, Ox85845dd1) 
11 (A, B, C, 0, Ms, 6, Ox6fa87e4f) 
11 (0, A, B, C, M15, 10, Oxfe2ce6eO) 
11 (C, 0, A, B, M6, 15, Oxa3014314) 
11 (B, C, 0, A, M13, 21, Ox4e0811a1) 
11 (A, B, C, 0, M4, 6, Oxf1537e82) 
11 (0, A, B, C, M11, 10, Oxbd3af235) 
11 (C, 0, A, B, M2, 15, Ox2ad7d2bb) 
11 (B, C, 0, A, Mg, 21, Oxeb86d391) 
After all of these four rounds, new updated A, B, C and D are added to the 
original variable respectively. Then the algorithm continues with the next block of 
message. The final output is the concatenation of A, B, C and D. 
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B. Algorithm of DSA 
Preparation: 
Global Public-Key p phme number where < < for 
Components 512<L< 1024 and L is p's length, multiple of 64 
bits. 
q Prime divisor of (p-1), where < q < 
g = modp ’ 
where h is any integer with l<h<(p-l) such 
that h(P-胸 m o d p > 1 
User's Private Key x Random or pseudorandom integer with 0 < x <q 
User's Public Key y = modp 
User's Per-Message k Random or pseudorandom integer with 0 <k <q 
Secret Number 
Signing: 
Input: Global components - p, q, g, k 
User's private key - x 
Message - M 
Output: Signature of M-r,s 
Procedure: r 二 (g众 modp)mo&q 
s=[k-\H{M) + xr)]moAq 
[H(M) means Hash of M using SHA-1] 
Verifying: 
Input: Global components - p , q , g 
User's public key - y 
Received version of M,r,s- M', r\ s' 
Output: Test result if the message is properly signed 
Procedure: w = (5')"^ modg 
w, = [H{M')w]modq 
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= (r')wmod^ 
V = [(g “1 广）mod p] mod q 
Test if V = r' 
In this algorithm, there are three parameters that are public and can be 
common to any user in the group. A large prime number q is chosen, 160 bits in 
length for the common use. Then another big prime p is selected between 512 and 
1024 bits such that q divides (p-1). Finally, g is computed in form of (广d�modp， 
where h is an integer between 1 and ip-1) with restriction that g is greater than 1 
modular p. 
With this preparation, user can select a private key and generate a public key. 
The private key x must be chosen randomly or pseudorandom from 1 to {q-1). Then 
the public key can be calculated by 少 = m o d p . The calculation of y from given x 
is straightforward. However, given the public key 少，it is computationally infeasible to 
deduce the private key which is discrete logarithm o f y to the base g mod/?. 
When signing, a user compute two parameters, r and s, that are functions of 
the global public-key components - p’ q, g, the users private key x, the hash value of 
the message, H(M), and an additional random or pseudorandom integer k that is 
unique in each signing. The signing process will be clear illustrated by Fig A-2. 
P — • ! q r—• f r 
g • 丁2 � k -1——• • • L • fi • s 
X • M • ! H • ! 
r = J2�k’P,q’g) 二 (g* modp)modq 
s = f[(MM�,k,x,r’q�= (k-\H(M)-^xr)) mod q 
Fig A-2 Signing using DSA 
At the receiving end, the verification is performed according the procedure 
described in the previous. First, the receiver generate a quantity v using a function of 
common public-key components, the sender's public key, hash value of the incoming 
message, H(M'). If the quantity matches the r component of the signature, then the 
signature is validated. And Fig A-3 depicts the verifying process. 
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M' • [ T T ] — 
r' • 
y — — • f _ _ — ^ 
g '4 : compare 
s ' — " • n r i T r ^ - ^ 
q - | • ! _ L J 
w = Ms\q) = (s'Y^ modq 
=((g(舉/ 垂 d9)mod p)modq 
Fig A-3 Verification process 
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C. Algorithm of RSA 
Key generation: 
Select p, q p and q are both prime 
Calculate n n = p x q 
Calculate (n) (f>{n) = (p- \){q -1) 
Select integer e gcd((^(n),e) = l; l<e< (/>(n) 
Calculate d d = mod 咖 ） 
Public key K�={e,n} 
Private key KR ={d,n} 
Encryption: 
Input: Plaintext message - M 
Global components - e , n 
Output: Ciphertext - C 
Procedure: C = M^ modn 
Decryption: 
Input: Ciphertext 一 C 
Global components - d , n 
Output: Plaintext - M 
Procedure: M = modn 
RSA algorithm makes the security based on the difficulty of factoring large 
primes. So first of all two large prime numbers, p and q, are randomly chosen. For 
maximum security,p and q are in equal lengths. The product n = pxq is computed. 
Then randomly choose the encryption key e, such that it is relatively prime to 
於(�) = (；?— • From extended Euclidean algorithm we can compute the 
decryption key d such that ed = 1 mod ({p - \){q 一 1)) or d == e—�mod ((p 一 l)(g -1)). 
Note that d and n are also relatively primes. The {e, n) are the public key; and {d, n) 
is the private key. But the two primes, p and q, are no longer needed. They must be 
discarded but never revealed. 
79 
To encrypt a message m, first divide it into blocks Mi smaller than n in binary. 
And then use the simple formula 
C, modn 
to encrypts them. If fix number of the blocks is needed, zero bits can be padded at the 
end of the blocks. 
And correspondingly the decryption can be performed by 
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